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ABSTRACT 
Should social media companies ban Holocaust denial from 
their platforms?  What about conspiracy theorists that spew hate?  
Does good corporate citizenship mean platforms should remove 
offensive speech or tolerate it?  The content moderation rules that 
companies develop to govern speech on their platforms will have 
significant implications for the future of freedom of expression.  
Given that the prospects for compelling platforms to respect 
users’ free speech rights are bleak within the U.S. system, what 
can be done to protect this important right?     
In June 2018, the United Nations’ top expert for freedom of 
expression called on companies to align their speech codes with 
standards embodied in international human rights law, 
particularly the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR).  After the controversy over de-platforming Alex 
Jones in August 2018, Twitter’s CEO agreed that his company 
should root its values in international human rights law and 
Facebook referenced this body of law in discussing its content 
moderation policies.   
This is the first article to explore what companies would need 
to do to align the substantive restrictions in their speech codes 
with Article 19 of the ICCPR, which is the key international 
standard for protecting freedom of expression. In order to 
examine this issue in a concrete way, this Article assesses whether 
Twitter’s hate speech rules would need to be modified.  This 
Article also evaluates potential benefits of and concerns with 
aligning corporate speech codes with this international standard. 
This Article concludes it would be both feasible and desirable for 
companies to ground their speech codes in this standard; 
however, further multi-stakeholder discussions would be helpful 
to clarify certain issues that arise in translating international 
human rights law into a corporate context.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 In the summer days leading up to July 4th, 2018, The Vindicator, 
a small newspaper based in Liberty, Texas, decided to post on its Facebook 
page a few paragraphs from the Declaration of Independence.1  Facebook 
blocked the tenth post because the content of those paragraphs of the 
Declaration violated its hate speech rules.2  Though it did not identify what 
                                                 
1 Casey Stinnett, Facebook’s Program Thinks Declaration of Independence is 
Hate Speech, THE VINDICATOR (July 2, 2018, 4:46 PM), http://www.thevindicator 
.com/news/article_556e1014-7e41-11e8-a85e-ab264c30e973.html.  
2 Id. The Vindicator’s tenth post contained the following language from the 
Declaration of Independence:  
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portion of the post was offensive, Facebook instructed the newspaper to 
remove any material that was inconsistent with its speech code.3  The 
newspaper was unable to reach anyone at Facebook to appeal the 
decision.4  The Vindicator published an article about what had happened, 
and this article was picked up by a number of news outlets in the United 
States and abroad,5 shining a bright light on this corporate censorship like 
fireworks illuminating an evening sky.  Despite being concerned about 
losing its Facebook page if future posts were also deemed unacceptable, 
The Vindicator reminded its readers that a corporation is not a 
governmental actor and “as such it is allowed to restrict use of its services 
as long as those restrictions do not violate any laws.”6  Within about a day, 
Facebook apologized and restored the content.7   
 Two weeks later, Facebook again made headlines about its speech 
code—this time for the opposite reason—when its CEO (Mark 
Zuckerberg) defended the company’s decision to permit Holocaust denial 
                                                 
He has abdicated Government here, by declaring us out of his 
Protection and waging War against us. He has plundered our seas, 
ravaged our Coasts, burnt our towns, and destroyed the lives of our 
people. He is at this time transporting large Armies of foreign 
Mercenaries to compleat the works of death, desolation and tyranny, 
already begun with circumstances of Cruelty & perfidy scarcely 
paralleled in the most barbarous ages, and totally unworthy the Head 
of a civilized nation. He has constrained our fellow Citizens taken 
Captive on the high Seas to bear Arms against their Country, to 
become the executioners of their friends and Brethren, or to fall 
themselves by their Hands. He has excited domestic insurrections 
amongst us, and has endeavoured to bring on the inhabitants of our 
frontiers, the merciless Indian Savages, whose known rule of 
warfare, is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes and 
conditions.  
Id.  
3 Id. The Vindicator surmised that the phrase “Indian Savages” triggered 
Facebook’s automated detection system for hate speech and that there had been 
no human review of the content. Id. This Article uses the phrase “speech code” or 
“speech rules” to refer to the terms of service and other rules issued by companies 
that substantively regulate user-generated content on their platforms. 
4 Id. The newspaper did send a general feedback message to Facebook about the 
situation. Id. 
5 See, e.g., Kevin Kelleher, Facebook Reportedly Apologizes after Flagging the 
Declaration of Independence as Hate Speech, FORTUNE (July 5, 2018), 
http://fortune.com/2018/07/05/facebook-apologizes-declaration-independence-
hate-speech-racist-vindicator/; Annie Grayer, Facebook Apologizes after 
Labeling Part of Declaration of Independence ‘Hate Speech,’ CNN (July 5, 2018, 
5:45 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/05/politics/facebook-post-hate-speech-
delete-declaration-of-independence-mistake/index.html; Facebook Finds 
Independence Document ‘Racist,’ BBC NEWS (July 5, 2018), 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-44722728.  
6 Stinnett, supra note 1. The first comment posted after the article argued that the 
First Amendment should apply to companies like Facebook. Id.  
7 Id.  
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posts on the platform.8  He stated users who upload such content were not 
“intentionally getting it wrong.”9  Unsurprisingly, his rationale triggered a 
backlash of commentary given the vast proof that this atrocity happened, 
with many criticizing Facebook’s decision to permit the hateful posts.10  
Soon thereafter, Mr. Zuckerberg clarified that he found Holocaust denials 
offensive and that he did not mean to defend the intent of deniers.11  He 
explained his company would prevent the spread of misinformation by 
reducing its visibility on Facebook’s News Feed, but would not prevent 
users from saying untrue things.12  He did, however, note that advocacy of 
hatred and violence against protected groups would be removed.13  This 
controversy led one commentator to say Facebook’s policy “is a 
hodgepodge of declarations and exceptions and exceptions to the 
exceptions.”14  Another reflected on the controversy by musing “[i]s it 
                                                 
8 Brett Molina, Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg, Rebuked for Comments on 
Holocaust Denial, Tries to Explain, USA TODAY (July 19, 2018, 9:22 AM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/nation-now/2018/07/19/facebook-mark-
zuckerberg-clarifies-comments-holocaust-deniers/799438002/; Lydia O’Connor, 
Mark Zuckerberg Says Facebook Won’t Remove Holocaust Denial Content, 
HUFFINGTON POST (July 18, 2018, 2:53 PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com 
/entry/zuckerberg-facebook-holocaust-denial_us_5b4f70f5e4b0de86f48901ea.  
9 O’Connor, supra note 8.  
10 See, e.g., Deborah Lipstadt, Zuckerberg’s Comments Give Holocaust Deniers 
an Opening, CNN (July 18, 2018, 8:43 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/ 
07/18/opinions/mark-zuckerberg-facebook-holocaust-denial-lipstadt-opinion/ 
index.html (arguing the agenda of Holocaust deniers is to “spread the very hatred 
that produced the Holocaust.”); Molina, supra note 8; O’Connor, supra note 8. 
11 Kara Swisher, Mark Zuckerberg Clarifies: ‘I Personally Find Holocaust Denial 
Deeply Offensive, and I Absolutely Didn’t Intend to Defend the Intent of Those 
Who Deny That,’ RECODE (July 18, 2018, 4:40 PM), https://www.recode.net/2018 
/7/18/17588116/mark-zuckerberg-clarifies-holocaust-denial-offensive.  
12 Id. (According to Zuckerberg, “[i]f something is spreading and is rated false by 
fact checkers, it would lose the vast majority of its distribution in News Feed. And 
of course if a post crossed [the] line into advocating for violence or hate against a 
particular group, it would be removed. These issues are very challenging but I 
believe that often the best way to fight offensive bad speech is with good 
speech.”).  
13 Id. That same day, Facebook issued an official policy that would allow it to 
remove misinformation in the form of advocacy of incitement to violence offline. 
Sheera Frenkel, Facebook to Remove Misinformation that Leads to Violence, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/18/technology/ 
facebook-to-remove-misinformation-that-leads-to-violence.html?rref=collection 
%2Fsectioncollection%2Ftechnology&action=click&contentCollection=technol
ogy&region=stream&module=stream_unit&version=latest&contentPlacement=
3&pgtype=section.  
14 Farhad Manjoo, What Stays on Facebook and What Goes? The Social Network 
Cannot Answer, N.Y. TIMES (July 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/ 
07/19/technology/facebook-misinformation.html.  
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ideal for a private company to define its own standards for speech and 
propagate them across the world?  No. But here we are.”15 
Perhaps we should not be surprised that private actors are 
engaging in a parallel governance exercise alongside governments in 
regulating online speech.16  In 1977, Oxford Professor Hedley Bull 
predicted that the international system could morph from being based on 
nation-states to one in which nations would share authority over their 
citizens with a variety of other powerful actors, including transnational 
corporations.17  He called this new international order “neo-medieval” 
because in medieval Europe there were not nation-states but rather a 
variety of competing powerful actors in society that exercised various 
forms of governance over individuals.18  Given that global social media 
companies now exercise traditional governmental functions by, among 
other things, enforcing their own speech codes on their platforms19 (a 
process that is known somewhat euphemistically as “content 
moderation”), it appears that aspects of Professor Bull’s neo-medieval 
world have materialized.20  
                                                 
15 Alexis Madrigal, Why Facebook Wants to Give You the Benefit of the Doubt, 
THE ATLANTIC (July 19, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/ 
2018/07/why-facebook-wants-to-give-you-the-benefit-of-the-doubt/565598/. 
16 Governments have also been active in regulating online speech. See generally 
SANJA KELLY, ET AL., FREEDOM HOUSE, SILENCING THE MESSENGER: 
COMMUNICATION APPS UNDER PRESSURE (2016), https://freedomhouse.org/ 
sites/default/files/FOTN_2016_BOOKLET_FINAL.pdf (finding high levels of 
censorship by governments throughout the world for online speech that is 
otherwise protected under international human rights law). 
17 HEDLEY BULL, THE ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: A STUDY OF ORDER IN WORLD 
POLITICS 245–46, 254–266 (2d. ed. 1995). See also ANTHONY CLARK AREND, 
LEGAL RULES AND INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 180–84 (1999) (arguing that after 
the Cold War the state-based system transitioned towards Professor Bull’s neo-
medieval system for several reasons, including the disintegration of states, the 
inability of states to provide for the needs of citizens, the provision of key services 
by transnational corporations, and the increased law making role of non-state 
actors).  
18 BULL, supra note 17, at 245. 
19 For example, Facebook had 1.47 billion daily users and 2.23 billion monthly 
users as of June 2018. Company Info, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM, 
https://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/ (last visited Aug. 4, 2018). The company 
has 7,500 content moderators who cover every time zone and 50 languages in 
implementing Facebook’s speech code (which is found in its “Community 
Standards”) on a worldwide basis. Ellen Silver, Hard Questions: Who Reviews 
Objectionable Content on Facebook – and is the Company Doing Enough to 
Support Them?, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (July 26, 2018), https://newsroom.fb. 
com/news/2018/07/hard-questions-content-reviewers/ (releasing information on 
its content moderation because “in recent weeks, more people have been asking 
about where we draw the line for what’s allowed on Facebook and whether our 
content reviewers are capable of applying these standards in a fair, consistent 
manner around the world.”).  
20 The trajectory towards a neo-medieval world has been further accelerated by 
nation-states proactively outsourcing their traditional governance functions over 
speech to social media companies by requiring them to adjudicate whether 
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The rules companies develop to govern speech on their platforms 
will have significant implications for the future of freedom of expression 
and indeed democracy both in the United States and abroad.  Even the U.S. 
Supreme Court has recognized that one of the most important places to 
exchange views is in cyberspace, particularly on social media.21  But how 
much will it matter ten or fifteen years from now that the First Amendment 
(and international human rights law) protect freedom of expression, if 
most communication happens online and is regulated by private platforms 
that do not—and are not required to—adhere to such long standing 
substantive norms on expression?22   
The controversies over Facebook’s deletion of paragraphs from 
the Declaration of Independence followed by its permission of Holocaust 
denial posts exemplify what is now a consistent news cycle regarding 
private sector content moderation practices.  For example, a few weeks 
after those controversies, major social media companies were again 
making headlines when they banned conspiracy theorist Alex Jones from 
their platforms; Twitter, however, garnered attention initially for not de-
platforming him (although Twitter later suspended him and ultimately 
banned him permanently).23  In recent years, there have been numerous 
                                                 
national and regional speech regulations are being violated online rather than 
having such issues adjudicated in courts. See, e.g., Alice Cuddy, German Law 
under Fire for Turning Social Media Companies into ‘Overzealous Censors,’ 
EURO NEWS (Feb. 14, 2018), http://www.euronews.com/2018/02/14/german-law-
under-fire-for-turning-social-media-companies-into-overzealous-censors- 
(discussing a recent German law that requires social media companies to decide 
if online speech violates the country’s criminal code and to remove illegal speech 
or face significant penalties); Jens-Henrik Jeppesen, First Report on the EU Hate 
Speech Code of Conduct Shows Need for Transparency, Judicial Oversight, and 
Appeals, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH.: BLOG (Dec. 12, 2016), 
https://cdt.org/blog/first-report-eu-hate-speech-code-of-conduct-shows-need-
transparency-judicial-oversight-appeals/ (describing how the European Union has 
outsourced adjudicating its hate speech standards to social media companies). 
21 Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017). 
22 As private sector actors, corporate speech decisions do not constitute 
governmental action and thus traditional sources of domestic (and international 
human rights) law on the permissibility of speech restrictions are not directly 
applicable to their actions. See Marvin Ammori, The “New” New York Times: 
Free Speech Lawyering in the Age of Google and Twitter, 127 HARV. L. REV. 
2259, 2273–83 (2014). Furthermore, in the United States, online intermediaries 
are (with a few exceptions) protected from liability for third party content, giving 
them significant discretion to regulate speech on their platforms. Id. at 2284–98; 
Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing 
Online Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598, 1604–09 (2018). For a discussion of the 
substantial challenges to compelling platforms to respect free speech rights of 
users under U.S. law, see generally Kyle Langvardt, Regulating Online Content 
Moderation, 106 GEO. L.J. 1353 (2018).  
23 Alex Jones runs the Infowars website and has promoted a number of conspiracy 
theories, “such as that the Sandy Hook school shooting was a hoax and that 
Democrats run a global child-sex ring.” Jack Nicas, Alex Jones and Infowars 
Content is Removed from Apple, Facebook, and YouTube, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 
2018), https://nytimes.com/2018/08/06/technology/infowars-alefx-jones-apple-
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calls for social media companies to remove various forms of offensive 
speech from their platforms as well as criticism that such companies delete 
too much speech.24  In July 2018, Congress held a hearing to question 
social media companies about their content moderation practices.25  Given 
                                                 
facebook-spotify.html. When Apple, Facebook, and YouTube removed most of 
Alex Jones’ posts from their platforms, the tech giants thrust “themselves into a 
fraught debate over their role in regulating what can be said online.” Id.; Cecelia 
Kang & Kate Conger, Inside Twitter’s Struggle Over What Gets Banned, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/10/technology/ 
twitter-free-speech-infowars.html (reporting on internal deliberations at Twitter 
about dehumanizing speech in the wake of criticism for not banning Alex Jones); 
Tony Romm, Twitter has Permanently Banned Alex Jones and Infowars, WASH. 
POST (Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2018/09/06/ 
twitter-has-permanently-banned-alex-jonesinfowars/?utm_term=.db721d364631 
(reporting on Twitter’s decision to suspend and then ban Alex Jones). 
24 See, e.g., Charlie Warzel, “A Honeypot for Assholes”: Inside Twitter’s 10-Year 
Failure to Stop Harassment, BUZZFEED NEWS (Aug. 11, 2016, 8:43 AM), 
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/charliewarzel/a-honeypot-for-assholes-
inside-twitters-10-year-failure-to-s (describing Twitter’s attempts to deal with 
abusive language given its commitment to free speech); Tracy Jan & Elizabeth 
Dwoskin, Silicon Valley Escalates Its War on White Supremacy Despite Free 
Speech Concerns, WASH. POST (Aug. 16, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/silicon-valley-escalates-its-
war-on-white-supremacy-despite-free-speech-concerns/2017/08/16/842771b8-
829b-11e7-902a-2a9f2d808496_story.html?utm_term=.8c4f8105c832 
(describing platform removals of hate speech after the 2017 deadly white 
supremacy rally in Charlottesville); People Don’t Trust Social Media – That’s a 
Growing Problem for Businesses, CBS NEWS (Jun. 18, 2018, 6:45 AM), 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/edelman-survey-shows-low-trust-in-social-
media/ (reporting 60% of survey participants want more government regulation 
of social media and over 66% want companies to do more to protect users from 
offensive content); Nabiha Syed & Ben Smith, A First Amendment for Social 
Platforms, MEDIUM (June 2, 2016), https://medium.com/@BuzzFeed/a-first-
amendment-for-social-platforms-202c0eab7054 (criticizing company speech 
codes as “improvised,” not grounded in tradition or principle, and lacking 
transparency).   
25 Facebook, Google, and Twitter: Examining the Content Filtering Practices of 
Social Media Giants, Hearing Before the House Judiciary Comm., 115th Cong. 
(2018), https://judiciary.house.gov/hearing/facebook-google-and-twitter-
examining-the-content-filtering-practices-of-social-media-giants/ (highlighting 
that some representatives expressed concerns that the platforms were banning too 
much speech or were engaging in politically motivated content moderation while 
others claimed companies were not banning enough speech). In early September, 
the House and Senate held further hearings involving Russian misinformation 
online as well as content moderation. Farhad Manjoo, What Jack Dorsey and 
Sheryl Sandberg Taught Congress and Vice Versa, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/06/technology/jack-dorsey-sheryl-sandberg-
congress-hearings.html. Soon thereafter, then-U.S. Attorney General Jeff 
Sessions convened his state counterparts to discuss freedom of speech and content 
moderation. Brian Fung & Tony Romm, Inside the Private Justice Department 
Meeting That Could Lead to New Investigations of Facebook, Google and Other 
Tech Giants, WASH. POST (Sept. 25, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
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significant pressure to “clean up” their platforms, some have opined that 
we have reached a tipping point of sorts in which social media companies 
are profoundly re-thinking their initial pro-free speech inclinations.26  At 
the end of July, the market capitalizations of Facebook and Twitter 
dropped significantly, in part because of the rising costs of securing their 
platforms and bolstering their global content moderation.27  In a timely and 
comprehensive book examining content moderation by social media 
companies, author Tarleton Gillespie states that “it is wholly unclear what 
the standards should be for content moderation.”28   
 The summer of 2018 seems to mark a liminal moment in the 
evolution of social media speech codes that will shape the future of free 
expression online in our neo-medieval world.  So where do we go from 
here?  Should companies be free to set their own rules for speech on their 
platforms based on their economic incentives and/or own views of 
                                                 
technology/2018/09/25/inside-big-meeting-federal-state-law-enforcement-that-
signaled-new-willingness-investigate-tech-giants/?utm_term=.bd73f664c69d.  
26 Julia Wong & Olivia Solon, Does the Banning of Alex Jones Signal a New Era 
of Big Tech Responsibility?, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 10, 2018, 7:00 AM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/aug/10/alex-jones-banning-
apple-facebook-youtube-twitter-free-speech (“[W]e are at an inflection point in 
the way internet platforms conceive of and protect public discourse for society at 
large.”). Other commentators acknowledge a shift is occurring in how such firms 
approach speech but have expressed more concern about the potential 
consequences of private sector content moderation for freedom of expression. See, 
e.g., Farhad Manjoo, Tech Companies Like Facebook and Twitter are Drawing 
Lines. It’ll be Messy, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2018/07/25/technology/tech-companies-facebook-twitter-responsibility.html 
(arguing that the “absolutist ethos” of tech companies is over and expressing 
concerns about their power to shape global discourse through content 
moderation); Madrigal, supra note 15 (“You don’t need to be a free-speech 
absolutist to imagine how this unprecedented, opaque, and increasingly 
sophisticated system [of content moderation] could have unintended 
consequences or be used to (intentionally or not) squelch minority viewpoints.”). 
27 Peter Eavis, The Cost of Policing Twitter and Facebook is Spooking Wall St. It 
Shouldn’t., N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/ 
07/27/business/dealbook/facebook-twitter-wall-street.html (reporting Facebook’s 
costs increased by 50% from 2017 to pay for, among other things, hiring hundreds 
of content moderators). Before their stocks tumbled, some had argued it was not 
sustainable for social media companies with enormous market capitalizations to 
have so few employees when seeking to engage in content moderation on a global 
scale. Henry Farrel, The New Economy’s Old Business Model is Dead, FOREIGN 
POL’Y (July 13, 2018, 8:30 AM), https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/07/13/the-new-
economys-old-business-model-is-dead-automation-jobs-ai-technology/ (noting 
pressures to regulate content online will force technology companies – which have 
not been big job creators relative to other major companies – to hire significantly 
more employees because algorithms are insufficient to deal with complex online 
speech issues). See also SCOTT GALLOWAY, THE FOUR: THE HIDDEN DNA OF 
AMAZON, APPLE, FACEBOOK, AND GOOGLE 266 (2017) (discussing the enormous 
disparity between market capitalizations and job creation by the biggest tech 
companies).  
28 TARLETON GILLESPIE, CUSTODIANS OF THE INTERNET 9, 206–07 (Yale 
University Press 2018).  
 
No. 1] DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW 34 
 
appropriate speech?  Should company speech codes change based on 
various national laws and customs?  Should governments regulate 
corporate content moderation?  
The United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur on the promotion 
and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, an 
independent expert appointed by UN member states who holds the top 
position on freedom of expression within the UN’s human rights 
machinery, proposed a way forward during his annual report to UN 
member states in Geneva in June 2018.  The Special Rapporteur 
recommended that private companies re-align their speech codes with the 
existing international human rights law regime.29  He referred to social 
media platforms as “enigmatic regulators” that were developing an 
obscure type of “platform law.”30  Determining what speech is acceptable 
based on existing international human rights law, he argued, would give 
companies a universal and principled basis to engage in content 
moderation.31  His recommendation to ground private sector speech codes 
in international standards was based on the 2011 UN Guiding Principles 
on Business & Human Rights, which reflect global expectations for 
companies to respect international human rights in their business 
operations.32  In the wake of the Alex Jones controversy, Twitter’s CEO 
tweeted that his company should root its values in international human 
rights law33 and Facebook referenced human rights law in discussing its 
content moderation policies.34 
 Does the UN expert’s recommendation to ground corporate 
speech codes in human rights law provide a viable (and desirable) way 
                                                 
29 David Kaye (Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right 
to freedom of opinion and expression), Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the 
Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, ¶¶ 
3, 45, 70, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/38/35 (Apr. 6, 2018) [hereinafter SR Report]. A few 
months earlier one of the leading international NGOs on freedom of expression 
made a similar call for companies to ground their speech policies in the 
international human rights regime. ARTICLE 19, SIDE-STEPPING RIGHTS: 
REGULATING SPEECH BY CONTRACT 39 (2018), https://www.article19.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/06/Regulating-speech-by-contract-WEB-v2.pdf.  
30 SR Report, supra note 29, ¶ 1. 
31 Id. at ¶ 42. 
32 See id. at ¶ 10 (“[T]he Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 
establish ‘global standard[s] of expected conduct’ that should apply throughout 
company operations and whenever they operate.”).  
33 Jack Dorsey (@jack), TWITTER (Aug. 10, 2018, 9:58 AM), https://twitter.com/ 
jack/status/1027962500438843397 [https://perma.cc/A297-PPMA].  
34 Richard Allan , Hard Questions: Where Do We Draw the Line on Freedom of 
Expression, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM (Aug. 9, 2018), https://newsroom.fb.com/ 
news/2018/08/hard-questions-free-expression/amp/?_twitter_impression=true 
[https://perma.cc/Z5NP-ABEL] (“We look for guidance in documents like Article 
19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which set 
standards for when it’s appropriate to place restrictions on freedom of expression 
. . . . The core concept here is whether a particular restriction of speech is 
necessary to prevent harm. Short of that, the ICCPR holds that speech should be 
allowed. This is the same test we use to draw the line on Facebook.”).  
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forward on the issue of private sector content moderation?  While much of 
the discourse to date on content moderation has focused on increasing 
corporate transparency measures and improving procedural protections for 
users,35 this Article focuses on the normative question of the substantive 
content of corporate speech codes applicable to user-generated content on 
their platforms.  In particular, this Article seeks to unpack what the call by 
the UN Special Rapporteur to re-align these private sector speech rules 
with international human rights law would mean as a practical matter for 
social media companies.  Part I of this Article provides background on 
international human rights law’s protections for freedom of expression, 
the UN Guiding Principles on Business & Human Rights, and the recent 
report on content moderation by the UN’s free speech expert.  Part II 
examines what this call to re-align private sector speech rules would entail 
by focusing on a particular platform’s hate speech code: the Twitter Rules.  
This examination describes aspects of Twitter’s speech code that would 
need to change as well as raises key questions that companies, scholars, 
civil society, and policymakers will need to grapple with if social media 
companies are to respect international human rights law standards.  Part 
III discusses potential criticisms and benefits of using international human 
rights law as the default for content moderation.  This Article concludes 
that it is both feasible and desirable to ground corporate speech codes in 
international human rights standards while noting that the road to this 
desired goal, even if paved with good intentions, will be bumpy and will 
require further multi-stakeholder input. 
I. BACKGROUND ON RELEVANT UN STANDARDS 
A. International Human Rights Law & Freedom of Expression 
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
is the most relevant treaty on the topic of freedom of expression.36  This 
treaty, which was opened for signature in 1966, has 172 State Parties, 
                                                 
35 See, e.g., Cindy Cohn, Bad Facts Make Bad Law: How Platform Censorship 
Has Failed So Far and How to Ensure that the Response to Neo-Nazi’s Doesn’t 
Make it Worse, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 432, 447–50 (2018), 
https://www.georgetownlawtechreview.org/bad-facts-make-bad-law-how-
platform-censorship-has-failed-so-far-and-how-to-ensure-that-the-response-to-
neo-nazis-doesnt-make-it-worse/GLTR-07-2018/ (advocating for a variety of 
procedural protections for platform users); JOHN BERGMAYER, EVEN UNDER KIND 
MASTERS: A PROPOSAL TO REQUIRE THAT DOMINANT PLATFORMS ACCORD 
THEIR USERS DUE PROCESS, PUB. KNOWLEDGE, (May 2018), 
https://www.publicknowledge.org/assets/uploads/blog/Even_Under_Kind_Mast
ers.pdf (arguing that dominant platforms should be expected to have procedures 
and requirements respecting users’ due process); Emma Llanso, Is Holocaust 
Denial Free Speech? Facebook Needs to be More Transparent, FORTUNE: 
COMMENTARY (July 24, 2018), http://fortune.com/2018/07/24/facebook-mark-
zuckerberg-holocaust-denial-free-speech/ (explaining that technology companies 
should “focus on . . . transparency, a clear appeals process, and user-
empowerment tools” when removing online content).  
36 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 19, ¶ 2, Dec. 16, 
1966, S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].  
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including the United States.37  ICCPR Article 19 protects the right to seek 
and receive information of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, and through 
any media.38  However, it also gives State Parties the discretion to restrict 
expression if they can prove that each prong of a three-part test has been 
met.39  Any restrictions on speech must be  
1. “provided by law” (i.e., the restriction must provide 
appropriate notice and must be properly promulgated) 
and  
2. “necessary” (i.e., the speech restriction must, among 
other things, be the least intrusive means)  
3. to achieve one of the listed public interest objectives 
(i.e., protection of the reputations and rights of others, 
national security, public order, public health or 
morals).40  
These three prongs are often referred to as the legality, necessity, and 
legitimacy tests.41  In addition to meeting each prong of Article 19’s 
tripartite test, any speech restriction must also be consistent with the 
ICCPR’s many other provisions, including its ban on discrimination.42   
                                                 
37 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UNITED NATIONS 
TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src= 
TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&clang=_en (last visited Oct. 1, 2018) 
[hereinafter UN Treaty Collection: ICCPR]. The United States became a party to 
the ICCPR in 1992. Id. 
38 ICCPR, supra note 36, at art. 19, ¶ 2. 
39 Id. at art. 19, ¶ 3. The UN Human Rights Committee, the body of independent 
experts who are elected by the treaty’s State Parties and charged with monitoring 
implementation of the ICCPR, has issued its recommended interpretations of 
Article 19 and made clear the burden of proving each prong of the tripartite test 
rests on the State seeking to limit speech. U.N. Human Rights Comm., General 
Comment No. 34, ¶ 35, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34 (Sept. 12, 2011) [hereinafter 
GC 34].  
40 ICCPR, supra note 36, at art. 19, ¶ 3. The interpretations of the tripartite test in 
the text above come from the Human Rights Committee’s most recent guidance 
on Article 19. See GC 34, supra note 39, ¶ 25–34 (discussing how to interpret the 
ICCPR’s tripartite test for restrictions on speech). The U.S. Government has 
interpreted the tripartite test similarly. See Freedom of Expression, 2011–12, 
DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, Ch.6, §L(2), at 
226–27 (explaining the U.S. Government’s view that “restrictions on expression 
must be prescribed by laws that are accessible, clear, and subject to judicial 
scrutiny; are necessary (e.g., the measures must be the least restrictive means for 
protecting the governmental interest and are compatible with democratic 
principles); and should be narrowly tailored to fulfill a legitimate government 
purpose . . . .”). 
41 See SR Report, supra note 29, ¶ 8. (noting that restrictions on free speech must 
meet “the cumulative conditions of legality, necessity, and legitimacy.”). 
42 The ICCPR prohibits discrimination in the implementation of treaty rights and 
requires State Parties to guarantee equal protection of the law without 
discrimination based on race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other 
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ICCPR Article 20(2) contains a mandatory ban on “any advocacy 
of national, racial, or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to 
violence, discrimination, or hostility.”43  This provision was highly 
contentious during the ICCPR negotiations; the U.S. delegation (led by 
Eleanor Roosevelt) and others advocated against it because it was vague 
and open to misuse, but the Soviet Union mustered the votes to keep it in 
the treaty.44  The scope of ICCPR Article 20 remains controversial to this 
day.  For example, a 2006 report by the UN High Commissioner on Human 
Rights found that governments did not agree about the meaning of the key 
terms in Article 20.45  The UN even took the extraordinary measure of 
convening experts from around the world to propose an appropriate 
interpretation of this contentious sentence,46 but this experts’ process has 
not bridged the gap among governments with respect to Article 20’s 
meaning.  Regardless of the precise scope of Article 20, if a government 
seeks to restrict speech under Article 20(2), that government continues to 
bear the burden of surmounting the high bar set forth in Article 19’s 
tripartite test, which significantly limits the potential reach of Article 20.47    
                                                 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, or other status. ICCPR, supra 
note 36, at arts. 2, 26. 
43 ICCPR, supra note 36, at art. 20, ¶ 2. 
44 For a discussion of these negotiations, see Evelyn M. Aswad, To Ban or Not to 
Ban Blasphemous Videos, 4 GEO. J. OF INT’L LAW, 1313, 1320–22 (2013). The 
United States became a party to the ICCPR with a reservation to Article 20 that 
states the article “does not authorize or require legislation or other action by the 
United States that would restrict the right of free speech and association protected 
by the Constitution and laws of the United States.” UN Treaty Collection: ICCPR, 
supra note 37.   
45 U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Incitement to Racial and Religious 
Hatred and the Promotion of Tolerance, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/2/6 (Sept. 20. 
2006) (finding states disagreed on the meaning of “incitement,” “hatred,” and 
“hostility”). 
46 U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Rep. on the Expert Workshops on 
the Prohibition of Incitement to National, Racial or Religious Hatred, ¶ 1, U.N. 
Doc. A/HRC/22/17/ADD. 4 (Jan. 11, 2013). 
47 See GC 34, supra note 39, ¶¶ 50–52. It should be noted that the UN Convention 
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) prohibits spreading ideas 
based on racial superiority or hatred as well as incitement to racial discrimination 
and violence. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination art. 4, Dec. 21, 1965, S. Exec. Doc. C. 95-2 (1978), 660 U.N.T.S. 
195. Any restrictions on speech imposed under this provision also must meet 
ICCPR Article 19(3)’s tripartite test. See U.N. Comm. on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation No. 35, ¶¶ 8, 12, 19, U.N. Doc. 
CERD/C/GC/35 (Sept. 26, 2013) (explaining that ICCPR Article 19(3)’s tripartite 
test of legality, necessity, and legitimacy is incorporated into this convention). 
The United States became a party to the CERD with the following reservation: 
“That the Constitution and laws of the United States contain extensive protections 
of individual freedom of speech, expression and association. Accordingly, the 
United States does not accept any obligation under this Convention, in particular 
under articles 4 and 7, to restrict those rights, through the adoption of legislation 
or any other measures, to the extent that they are protected by the Constitution 
and laws of the United States.” International Convention on the Elimination of 
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B. The UN Guiding Principles on Business & Human Rights  
1. General Background  
As transnational corporate actors gained enormous power and 
wealth, their adverse impacts on human rights began to spark discussions 
at the United Nations.  The debate involved whether the international 
human rights regime (which generally focuses on state action) could or 
should apply to such non-state actors.  A group of independent experts 
tasked with making recommendations on this topic essentially proposed 
applying the existing human rights regime directly to companies in a 2003 
document commonly referred to as “the Norms.”48  This approach was 
rejected by UN member states in 2004 and was generally criticized by the 
business community.49  The following year, the UN Secretary General 
appointed a Special Representative on Human Rights and Transnational 
Corporations and Other Enterprises (Harvard professor John Ruggie) to 
try to resolve the complex issue of the appropriate relationship of 
international human rights law with respect to corporate actors.50  
For six years, Professor Ruggie held numerous consultations 
throughout the world with stakeholders from business, civil society, 
indigenous groups, and UN member states.51  He rejected the approach set 
forth in the Norms.52  In 2011, he proposed to the UN Human Rights 
Council an alternative approach known as the Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights (the UNGPs), which were unanimously 
endorsed by the Council (including the United States).53  The U.S. 
Government subsequently encouraged American companies to implement 
the UNGPs and to treat them as a floor rather than a ceiling in their 
operations.54   
                                                 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination, UNITED NATIONS TREATY COLLECTION, 
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
2&chapter=4&clang=_en (last visited Aug. 12, 2018). 
48 PHILIP ALSTON & RYAN GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS, 1471–
72 (2d ed. 2012).  
49 Id. at 1477. 
50 Id. at 1477–78. 
51 Id. at 1478–79.  
52 See id. (Ruggie decided that the Norms were flawed because, among other 
things, they stated corporations were already bound by international human rights 
instruments, which he found had “little authoritative basis in international law.”).  
53 Human Rights Council Res. 17/4, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/17/4 (July 6, 2011); 
John Ruggie, Rep. of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the 
issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises to the Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 
2011) [hereinafter UNGPs]. 
54 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, H. R. AND LAB., U.S. 
GOVERNMENT APPROACH ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 4 (2013), 
https://photos.state.gov/libraries/korea/49271/july_2013/dwoa_USG-Approach-
on-Business-and-Human-Rights-updatedJune2013.pdf; U.S. GOVERNMENT, 
RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS CONDUCT: FIRST NATIONAL ACTION PLAN FOR THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 17 (2016), https://www.state.gov/e/eb/eppd/ 
csr/naprbc/265706.htm.  
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The UNGPs embody the international community’s expectations 
for how companies should act when facing human rights issues in the 
course of their business operations.  In a nutshell, the UNGPs specify that 
companies should “respect” human rights, which means companies 
“should avoid infringing on the human rights of others and should address 
adverse human rights impacts with which they are involved.”55  Thus, 
while companies do not have all of the same human rights obligations as 
states do under international human rights law, corporate actors are 
expected to avoid adversely impacting the enjoyment of human rights and 
to provide remedies if rights are undermined.  The UNGPs define “human 
rights” according to international instruments (including the ICCPR) 
rather than regional ones,56 which can be less protective of human rights.57  
The UNGPs expect companies to, among other things, develop human 
rights policies, actively engage with external stakeholders in assessing 
human rights challenges, conduct due diligence to assess potential risks to 
human rights, and develop strategies to avoid infringing on rights.58  
Where national law conflicts with international human rights law 
standards, companies should seek ways to avoid infringing on human 
rights, but ultimately should comply with local law and address any 
adverse impacts.59  The UNGPs apply to all companies regardless of size, 
but “the scale and complexity of the means through which enterprises meet 
that responsibility may vary.”60  This provides some measure of flexibility 
in their implementation. 
2. The UNGPs in the Context of Social Media Companies 
 Freedom of expression represents one of the most salient human 
rights issues that intersects with the business operations of social media 
companies.61  For social media companies to implement the UNGPs, they 
need to understand the scope of the right to freedom of expression under 
international human rights law.  Additionally, social media companies 
should assess the risk of potential infringements on expression that occur 
during their business operations.  Such infringements frequently happen 
in two ways: (1) by cooperating with governmental demands that do not 
meet international human rights law standards (e.g., governmental 
                                                 
55 UNGPs, supra note 53, at Principle 11.  
56 Id. at Principle 12 (emphasizing that business enterprises should respect 
internationally recognized human rights).  
57 See infra notes 90–93 and accompanying text. 
58 UNGPs, supra note 53, at Principles 13–21. 
59 Id. at Principle 23 and accompanying commentary. 
60 Id. at Principle 14 and accompanying commentary (“The means through which 
a business enterprise meets its responsibility to respect human rights will be 
proportional to, among other factors, its size. Small and medium-sized enterprises 
may have less capacity as well as more informal processes and management 
structures than larger companies, so their respective policies and processes will 
take on different forms.”). This Article focuses on the largest American social 
media platforms.  
61 There are other salient human rights issues that often come up in the context of 
social media companies (e.g., privacy), but this section focuses on expression 
given the overall nature and scope of this Article. 
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demands to remove speech critical of the head of state) and (2) by 
imposing their own corporate speech codes on user-generated content that 
restrict speech otherwise protected under international human rights law.  
Although most companies do not ground their internal speech 
codes in international human rights law,62 several large social media 
companies have already been quite active in seeking to implement the 
UNGPs when they face governmental demands that do not meet 
international human rights law standards.  For example, the Global 
Network Initiative (GNI) involves a multi-stakeholder collaboration 
among companies (such as Google, Facebook, and Microsoft), investors, 
civil society, and academics to provide guidance about respecting freedom 
of expression in line with international standards.63  GNI companies are 
expected to understand the scope of international freedom of expression 
standards and assess whether governmental demands to restrict speech 
comport with ICCPR Article 19 and its tripartite test (e.g., are restrictions 
on speech vague or not properly promulgated, are the least intrusive means 
used, and are regulations imposed for legitimate public interest 
reasons?).64  If governmental laws or orders fail the tripartite test, GNI 
companies are expected to resist implementing the government’s demand 
to the extent possible before complying with local law.65  GNI companies 
may resist by, inter alia, initiating lawsuits in local courts and asking for 
the assistance of other governments or the UN’s human rights 
machinery.66  The GNI’s assessment mechanism has consistently found 
that participating companies have been implementing their 
commitments.67   
3. What about the Free Expression Rights of Social Media Companies? 
A question that frequently arises in this context is whether 
expecting companies to align their internal speech codes with international 
human rights law violates their corporate free speech rights.  While 
corporations have free speech rights under U.S. domestic law,68 
international human rights law protections extend only to natural persons 
and not to legal persons.  The ICCPR provides that each State Party must 
respect and ensure “to all individuals within its territory and subject to its 
                                                 
62 SR Report, supra note 29, ¶¶ 10, 24. Since the report was issued, Twitter and 
Facebook have expressed openness towards turning to international human rights 
law in regulating speech. See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text.  
63 GLOBAL NETWORK INITIATIVE, https://globalnetworkinitiative.org/ (last visited 
July 26, 2018). This initiative also covers privacy issues. Id. 
64 GNI Principles, GLOBAL NETWORK INITIATIVE, https://globalnetworkinitiative. 
org/gni-principles/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2018). 
65 Implementation Guidelines, GLOBAL NETWORK INITIATIVE, https://globalnet 
workinitiative.org/implementation-guidelines/ (last visited July 30, 2018). 
66 Id. 
67 Company Assessments, GLOBAL NETWORK INITIATIVE, https://globalnetwork 
initiative.org/company-assessments/ (last visited July 30, 2018). 
68 See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n., 558 U.S. 310, 342–45 
(2010).  
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jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant.”69  The UN 
Human Rights Committee, the body of independent experts charged with 
monitoring implementation of the ICCPR and recommending 
interpretations of the text, has stated that only individuals (and not 
corporate entities) are holders of rights.70  International law scholars have 
likewise taken this position.71  Thus, requiring social media platforms to 
have speech codes based on international human rights law standards 
would not necessarily violate the speech rights of corporations under 
international human rights law as they do not hold such rights.  That said, 
the UNGPs are not a legally binding framework and the U.S. government 
has only encouraged, not mandated, their implementation.72  If an 
American platform chooses not to respect international human rights in 
the content and enforcement of its speech code, it would not necessarily 
violate international or U.S. law, but it would be acting inconsistently with 
the global expectations embodied in the UNGPs. 
C. The UN Special Rapporteur’s Report 
In June 2018, the UN Special Rapporteur presented his annual 
report to the Human Rights Council in which he recommended “a 
framework for the moderation of user-generated online content that puts 
human rights at the very centre.”73  The report called on companies to align 
their content moderation policies with international human rights law and, 
in doing so, cited to the UNGPs.74  In particular, the Special Rapporteur 
called on companies to align the substance of their speech codes with 
ICCPR Article 19(3)’s tripartite test of legality, necessity, and 
legitimacy.75  He noted few Internet “companies apply human rights 
                                                 
69 ICCPR, supra note 36, at art. 2, ¶ 1 (emphasis added). From a plain language 
reading, it is important that this treaty uses the word “individuals” rather than 
“persons,” which indicates the treaty rights pertain to natural persons rather than 
legal persons. 
70 U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 31, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13 (May 26, 2004). 
71 See, e.g., Thomas Burgenthal, To Respect and To Ensure, State Obligations and 
Permissible Derogations, in THE INT’L BILL OF RIGHTS: THE COVENANT ON CIVIL 
AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 73 (Louis Henkin ed. 1981) (“Juridical persons enjoy no 
rights under the covenant.”). 
72 See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
73 SR Report, supra note 29, ¶ 2. 
74 See id. at ¶¶ 10, 45, 70. Access Now and the Electronic Frontier Foundation, 
which are leading NGOs that are involved in issues of freedom of expression 
online, have also reaffirmed this call. See Access Now (@accessnow), TWITTER 
(Aug. 13, 2018, 5:46 PM), https://twitter.com/ 
accessnow/status/1029167419888214016 [https://perma.cc/RK72-W927]; 
Electronic Frontier Foundation (@EFF), TWITTER (Aug. 13, 2018, 5:29 PM), 
https://twitter.com/EFF/status/1029162979453886464  
[https://perma.cc/QZ4T-P2RX].  
75 See SR Report, supra note 29, ¶¶ 45–47. It should be noted that the UN expert 
on countering terrorism while respecting human rights has also criticized 
Facebook for using overly broad and vague language on terrorist content in its 
community guidelines and called on the company to align its speech code with 
international human rights law. Isa Qasim, Exclusive: U.N. Human Rights Experts 
 
No. 1] DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW 42 
 
principles in their operations, and most that do see them as limited to how 
they respond to government threats and demands.”76  The report noted it 
would be in the companies’ interests to align their internal speech codes 
with international human rights law because their speech codes would be 
grounded in universally agreed principles.77  Rather than defending their 
“homegrown” versions of the appropriate parameters on worldwide 
speech, companies would be on firmer ground in discussions with 
governments (which often want them to censor too much speech) if their 
speech codes were aligned with international human rights protections.78  
The report also called for companies to implement a variety of improved 
transparency and procedural safeguards.79   
II. ALIGNING CORPORATE SPEECH CODES WITH INTERNATIONAL 
STANDARDS 
Currently, each social media company has its own policies about 
what types of speech are unacceptable on its platform.80  As Gillespie notes 
in his overview of corporate speech codes, these policies often display a 
fundamental tension between a corporate reluctance to intervene and “a 
fear of not intervening,”81 with “a range of registers on display: fussy 
schoolteacher, stern parent, committed fellow artist, easygoing friend.”82  
In order to explore in a concrete way what re-aligning corporate speech 
codes to be consistent with the UNGPs and international human rights law 
would entail, this section examines the general approach to speech by one 
large social media company, Twitter.  This section also analyzes Twitter’s 
particular rules on hate speech to determine what, if anything, would need 
to change in such a re-alignment.83  The analysis concludes that Twitter 
                                                 
Meet with Facebook on “Overly Broad” Definitions of Terrorist Content, JUST 
SECURITY (Sept. 3, 2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/60554/exclusive-u-n-
rapporteur-facebook-fight-terrorist-content-risks-ensnaring/.  
76 SR Report, supra note 29, ¶ 10.  
77 Id. at ¶¶ 42–43, 70. 
78 Id. at ¶ 42. 
79 For example, the Special Rapporteur called for “radically different approaches 
to transparency at all stages” include sharing “case law” that shows how 
companies apply their speech codes. Id. at ¶ 71. The Special Rapporteur 
recommended increased disclosure of trends in decision making and called for 
companies to provide appeal processes and remedies for infringements on speech. 
Id. at ¶¶ 47, 58, 72. He noted that creating “social media councils” to hear 
complaints and rectify speech infringements could provide a scalable way 
forward. Id. at ¶ 58. He also recommended that companies subject themselves to 
some form of public accountability, potentially through the creation of “industry-
wide accountability mechanisms[.]” Id. at ¶ 72. 
80 GILLESPIE, supra note 28, at 45–73.  
81 Id. at 50. 
82 Id. at 48.  
83 Twitter’s speech code also covers a variety of topics beyond hate speech, 
including intellectual property issues, graphic violence and adult content, threats 
of violence, and the promotion of self-harm. See The Twitter Rules, TWITTER, 
https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/twitter-rules 
[https://perma.cc/NXA3-2H4F]. This section is limited to consideration of 
Twitter’s hate speech rules in order to provide a focused exposition of the analysis 
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would need to make substantial revisions to its rules in order to align them 
with international standards, and that even a good faith attempt at such re-
alignment would leave some key issues open for additional discussion.  
A. Twitter’s General Approach to Online Speech 
Twitter states that protecting users’ freedom of expression is one 
of its core values.84  The underpinnings of its general philosophy on speech 
are as follows: 
while grounded in the United States Bill of Rights and 
the European Convention on Human Rights, [Twitter’s 
approach] is informed by a number of additional sources 
including the members of our Trust and Safety Council, 
relationships with advocates and activists around the globe, and 
by works such as [the] United Nations Principles on Business 
and Human Rights.85 
Unfortunately, this foundational statement is both internally inconsistent 
and departs from the UNGPs.  To begin with, it says Twitter’s approach 
to freedom of expression is “grounded” in the U.S. Bill of Rights, 
presumably the First Amendment in particular, as well as the European 
Convention on Human Rights.  This statement is internally inconsistent 
because the interpretations of free speech under the First Amendment and 
under the European Convention on Human Rights are often in conflict.  
For example, the European Court of Human Rights has upheld the banning 
of a blasphemous film86 while the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled 
blasphemy bans unconstitutional.87  Similarly, under U.S. law, denials of 
historic atrocities as well as hate speech are generally permissible as long 
as there is no advocacy of incitement to imminent violence or a true threat 
of harm.88  The European Court of Human Rights, on the other hand, has 
often upheld bans on hateful speech as well as denial of historic atrocities 
                                                 
and revisions that would be needed when a social media company seeks to 
compare provisions in its speech code with international human rights law. This 
section discusses The Twitter Rules as they existed on August 31, 2018. 
84 Defending and Respecting the Rights of People Using Our Service, TWITTER, 
https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/defending-and-respecting-our-
users-voice [https://perma.cc/75W3-GHD7]. Although Twitter’s core values and 
approach also encompass privacy, this section focuses on the expression aspects 
given the scope of this Article. 
85 Id.  
86 Otto-Preminger-Institute v. Austria, 295 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶¶ 51–57 (1994). 
The European Court of Human Rights continues to highlight this 1994 case as 
good law in its religious freedom overview on its website. EUROPEAN COURT OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS, RESEARCH DIV., OVERVIEW OF THE COURT’S CASE-LAW ON 
FREEDOM OF RELIGION 20 (2013), http://echr.coe.int/Documents/ 
Research_report_religion_ENG.pdf.  
87 Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 506 (1952). 
88 Erik Bleich, Freedom of Expression Versus Racist Hate Speech: Explaining 
Differences Between High Court Regulations in the USA and Europe, 40 J. OF 
ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUD. 283, 283–84 (2014). 
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without a showing of likely lawless action in the near to midterm.89  Given 
such significant divergences between American and European approaches 
to speech, it is unclear how Twitter’s philosophy on freedom of expression 
can be grounded in both jurisprudential sources.  
Moreover, this statement of foundational principles departs from 
the UNGPs, which provide that companies should seek to align their 
operations with international human rights law rather than domestic laws 
(like the U.S. Bill of Rights) or regional law (such as the European Human 
Rights Convention).  Regional human rights law often departs from 
international law with regard to freedom of expression.  For example, 
while the European Court of Human Rights has upheld blasphemy bans,90 
the UN Human Rights Committee, which recommends interpretations of 
the ICCPR, has generally condemned bans on blasphemous speech.91  
Similarly, the European Court of Human Rights has upheld criminal bans 
on speech that denies historic atrocities,92 whereas the UN Human Rights 
Committee has disapproved of such censorship.93  In sum, regional human 
rights instruments (and monitoring bodies) are not international human 
rights instruments (and monitoring bodies).  Thus, the scope of protection 
afforded under each may differ.  As a statement of global expectations, the 
UNGPs are properly pinned to international instruments and not regional 
instruments, unlike Twitter’s general philosophy on speech. 
It should also be noted that, by selectively highlighting one 
region’s human rights convention (i.e. Europe), Twitter opens itself up to 
claims from countries in other regions that their own regional human rights 
instruments should be used to evaluate speech uploaded or viewed in their 
parts of the world.  Those regional instruments can also depart from the 
ICCPR and provide fewer protections.  For example, the Human Rights 
Declaration of the Association of South East Asian Nations94 (ASEAN) 
limits rights, including freedom of expression, in a variety of ways that are 
inconsistent with international standards.95  The Organization of Islamic 
                                                 
89 Id. See also Noah Feldman, Free Speech in Europe Isn’t What Americans Think, 
BLOOMBERG: VIEW (Mar. 19, 2017, 9:33 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/ 
view/articles/2017-03-19/free-speech-in-europe-isn-t-what-americans-think.  
90 Otto-Preminger-Institute, 295 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), ¶¶ 51–57.  
91 GC 34, supra note 39, ¶ 48 (“Prohibitions of displays of lack of respect for a 
religion or other belief system, including blasphemy laws, are incompatible with 
the Covenant, except in the specific circumstances envisaged in article 20, 
paragraph 2, of the Covenant.”).  
92 Bleich, supra note 88, at 283–84. 
93 GC 34, supra note 39, ¶ 49 (“Laws that penalize the expression of opinions 
about historical facts are incompatible with the obligations that the Covenant 
imposes on States parties in relation to the respect for freedom of opinion and 
expression. The Covenant does not permit general prohibition of expressions of 
an erroneous opinion or an incorrect interpretation of past events.”).  
94 ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN 
STATES (Nov. 19, 2012), http://asean.org/asean-human-rights-declaration/.  
95 The ASEAN Declaration’s inappropriate limitations on rights include “the use 
of the concept of ‘cultural relativism’ to suggest that rights in the [Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights] do not apply everywhere; stipulating that domestic 
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Cooperation, which is comprised of 57 nations,96 has formed a human 
rights system.  This system is based in part on the Cairo Declaration on 
Human Rights in Islam, which explicitly limits free speech according to 
Shariah norms.97  What basis does Twitter have for favoring (or applying) 
Europe’s regional approach to human rights in its global operations over 
other regions’ human rights instruments?  It is only by citing to universal 
standards embodied in international human rights law that Twitter can 
claim to ground its worldwide rules in a fair manner.  
If Twitter were to heed the UN Special Rapporteur’s call to act 
consistently with the UNGPs, the company would need to revise the 
general philosophy underlying its speech code by making at least two key 
changes.  First, rather than highlighting any particular domestic laws or 
regional human rights instruments, the philosophical statement should 
reference a commitment to aligning its approach to speech with 
international human rights law and ICCPR Article 19 in particular.  
Second, Twitter’s approach should not be “informed” by the UNGPs, but 
rather it should clearly commit to “implementing” the UNGPs.  Such 
fundamental revisions in its basic philosophy would result in a shift with 
respect to the substance and execution of its speech code and warrant 
appropriate training to mainstream a new approach grounded in 
international human rights law. 
B. Twitter’s Approach to Hate Speech 
Twitter’s hate speech provisions appear under the “hateful 
conduct” and “hateful imagery and display names” headings of its speech 
code.98  With respect to hateful conduct, users may not promote “violence 
against, threaten, or harass other people on the basis of race, ethnicity, 
national origin, sexual orientation, gender, gender identity, religious 
affiliation, age, disability, or serious disease.”99  Prohibited hate speech is 
further defined as, among other things, speech that harasses by wishing for 
harm of individuals or groups, inciting fear of a protected group, and 
repeating content that degrades someone.100  Decisions about whether 
                                                 
laws can trump universal human rights; incomplete descriptions of rights that are 
memorialized elsewhere; introducing novel limits to rights; and language that 
could be read to suggest that individual rights are subject to group veto.” Press 
Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, ASEAN Declaration on Human Rights Press 
Statement (Nov. 20, 2012), https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/ 
2012/11/200915.htm. 
96 Member States, ORGANISATION OF ISLAMIC COOPERATION, https://www.oic-
oci.org/states/?lan=en (last visited Aug. 10, 2018).  
97 The Organisation of the Islamic Cooperation, The Cairo Declaration on Human 
Rights in Islam art. 22, Aug. 5, 1990, Annex to Res. No. 49/19-P, available at 
https://www.oic-iphrc.org/en/data/docs/legal_instruments/OIC_HRRIT/ 
571230.pdf.  
98 TWITTER, supra note 83. Other forms of abusive speech are also covered by 
Twitter’s rules, but the focus of this Article is on the company’s hateful conduct, 
hateful imagery, and hateful display policies.    
99 Id.  
100 Hateful Conduct Policy, TWITTER: HELP CENTER, https://help.twitter.com/en/ 
rules-and-policies/hateful-conduct-policy [https://perma.cc/LU63-AVTP]. 
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violations have occurred are made by referring to context, including 
discussions with aggrieved persons.101  Users are also prohibited from 
using “hateful images or symbols in [their] profile image or profile header” 
as well as using their “username, display name, or profile bio to engage in 
abusive behavior, such as targeted harassment or expressing hate towards 
a person, group, or protected category.”102    
There are a variety of consequences for violations.  For example, 
Twitter can make tweets less visible in several ways, including with 
respect to search results.103  Twitter can also prevent rule violators from 
tweeting again until they delete tweets that cross the line and can hide the 
tweets until they are deleted.104  If a profile is non-compliant, Twitter can 
make it unavailable until it is changed.105  An account can also be placed 
in “read only” mode, limiting the violator’s ability to tweet, retweet, or 
like content.106  Twitter’s most severe penalty is permanent account 
suspension, which removes the account from view (and violators are 
prohibited from creating new Twitter accounts).107  The type of reprimand 
is based on a variety of factors, including the severity of the violation, the 
user’s track record of behavior on Twitter, and whether the topic may be 
of legitimate public interest.108   
1. Is Twitter’s Hate Speech Ban Vague? 
As discussed in Part I, for any restriction on speech to be valid 
under the ICCPR, the restriction must be (1) “provided by law” (e.g., not 
vague) and (2) “necessary” (e.g., the least intrusive means) (3) to achieve 
a legitimate aim.109  If we apply the ICCPR’s tripartite test in the context 
of Twitter’s hate speech rules, it is clear that aspects of Twitter’s rules 
would need revision, particularly with respect to the requirement that 
speech restrictions not be vague (as many terms in Twitter’s hate speech 
ban are unclear).  For example, what is the scope of speech that constitutes 
“expressing hate” towards someone or a group?  What range of speech 
“degrades” someone?  Which images would meet the “hateful” threshold?  
The UN Special Rapporteur found, as a general matter, that “[c]ompany 
policies on hate, harassment, and abuse also do not clearly indicate what 
constitutes an offence,” and he highlighted, in particular, Twitter’s 
prohibition on speech that “incites fear about a protected group” as 
                                                 
101 Id.  
102 TWITTER, supra note 83. 
103 Our Range of Enforcement Options, TWITTER: HELP CENTER, 
https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/enforcement-options 
[https://perma.cc/F6VD-E7X3].  
104 Id. 
105 Id.  
106 Id.  
107 Id.  
108 Our Approach to Policy Development and Enforcement Philosophy, TWITTER, 
https://help.twitter.com/en/rules-and-policies/enforcement-philosophy 
[https://perma.cc/89KT-DJ9A]. 
109 See supra notes 36–47 and accompanying text.  
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subjective and vague.110  Twitter would need to revise its hate speech rules 
to address a variety of vagueness issues to pass the  “legality” prong of the 
ICCPR’s tripartite test.111 
2. Do Twitter’s Hate Speech Rules Constitute the “Least Intrusive 
Means?”  
While the UN Special Rapporteur’s report provided some tangible 
guidance on what it would look like for companies to respect the first 
prong of ICCPR Article 19(3)’s tripartite test,112 his commentary does not 
address details of how a company would apply the second or third prongs 
of Article 19(3) in its operations.113  A company may consider approaching 
Article 19(3)’s second prong (i.e., the “necessity” or “least intrusive 
means” test) by drawing on lessons learned from governments’ 
experiences.  This section reviews some of those experiences and proposes 
a company would need, at a minimum, to publicly commit to three steps 
to act consistently with the “necessity” prong of the tripartite test.  First, a 
company should evaluate the means at its disposal to achieve a legitimate 
aim without infringing on speech.  Second, in assessing various options 
that infringe on speech, a company should select the option that reflects 
the least intrusion on speech interests.  Third, the company should 
periodically assess whether the selected measure helps to achieve the 
legitimate aim or not.  Each step involves an analysis that differs from—
but can be usefully informed by—how governmental actors are expected 
to analyze these issues.  
Turning to the first step, what are the types of options available to 
companies to achieve legitimate aims that do not involve infringing on 
                                                 
110 SR Report, supra note 29, ¶ 26. The Special Rapporteur is not alone in his 
concern that company speech codes are vague. During a Congressional hearing in 
September 2018, Twitter’s CEO acknowledged “if you were to go to our rules 
today and sit down with a cup of coffee, you would not be able to understand 
them.” Manjoo, supra note 25. (Perhaps the best example of the vagueness issues 
with the Twitter Rules is that the company initially felt Alex Jones had not 
violated its speech code, then determined he merited a temporary suspension, and 
then de-platformed him. See supra note 23 and infra note 141.) It should also be 
noted that, under the ICCPR, any speech restrictions must also comply with the 
treaty’s other protections, including its ban on discrimination. Article 26 of the 
ICCPR provides equal protection for a wide array of groups. ICCPR, supra note 
36, at art. 26. Twitter’s list of protected groups is not as broad as the ICCPR’s list 
of groups because the company’s list does not, for example, cover political 
groups. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.  
111 Corporations have an incentive to keep their speech codes vague because it 
helps them take the position they are correct in whatever enforcement action they 
choose to implement. That said, if a company pledges to respect Article 19(3) in 
its speech code, it would be possible for civil society and users to assess if the 
company has overcome its inclinations or has maintained vague speech codes.  
112 SR Report, supra note 29, ¶¶ 26–27, 46 (discussing vagueness problems with 
company speech codes). 
113 Id. at ¶¶ 28, 47 (calling for increased transparency when discussing the second 
prong of the tripartite test rather than providing granular guidance for 
implementation).    
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speech, including deleting speech or blocking speakers from their 
platforms?  To answer this question in the context of corporate actors, it is 
instructive to examine the toolkit that the international community has 
agreed governments should use to fight religious hatred and intolerance.  
For over ten years at the United Nations, countries fought about whether 
it was necessary to ban blasphemy, speech that embodies religious hatred, 
or speech that otherwise greatly offends religious sensibilities to promote 
religious tolerance.114  Some nations argued it was necessary to ban such 
speech not only to promote tolerance, but also for individuals to feel 
comfortable to practice their religious beliefs and to feel safe in society.   
In 2011, the international community ultimately determined in 
UN Human Rights Council Resolution 16/18 that governments have a host 
of options short of broad bans on speech to end religious hatred and 
promote tolerance.115  These options include promoting relevant 
educational initiatives and inter-faith dialogues, training government 
employees in effective outreach strategies to vulnerable groups, 
encouraging government officials to speak out against intolerance, and 
robustly implementing discrimination and hate crimes laws (i.e., 
punishing discriminatory behavior as a way of preventing potential 
harmful impacts of intolerant speech).116  This resolution only calls for a 
ban on speech when there is incitement to imminent violence, which 
reflects the U.S. constitutional standard for banning speech that incites 
harm.117  This set of proactive good governance actions, short of broad 
speech bans, is often referred to as the “16/18 consensus toolkit.”118  Under 
this rubric, it would be inappropriate for a government to resort to banning 
offensive speech to promote religious tolerance if the government had not 
even tried to engage in the basic good governance measures set forth in 
the 16/18 toolkit.  In other words, resorting to speech bans without 
engaging in good governance measures would not constitute the “least 
intrusive means” to achieving religious tolerance and public order. 
When considering what options companies should consider before 
infringing on speech in situations involving, among other things, online 
hatred and intolerance, it is helpful to keep this 16/18 toolkit in mind.  Like 
governments, companies can also speak out on issues, educate users, and 
promote dialogue on contentious issues.  It seems that companies have 
already been implementing some activities similar to those in the 16/18 
toolkit to help them tackle several pressing issues.  For example, Facebook 
has been funding a variety of dialogue and counter-narrative approaches 
to combatting hate and violent extremism.119  Google has been funding 
                                                 
114 Aswad, supra note 44, at 1323.  
115 Human Rights Council Res. 16/18, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/16/18 (Apr. 12, 
2011) [hereinafter Council Res. 16/18].  
116 Id. at ¶¶ 5–6.  
117 Aswad, supra note 44, at 1325. 
118 Id. at 1328. 
119 See, e.g., Jeremy Kahn, How Facebook Can Fight the Hate, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (May 25, 2017, 4:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/features/2017-05-25/how-facebook-can-fight-the-hate (discussing specific 
 
49             THE FUTURE OF FREEDOM                    [Vol. 17 
OF EXPRESSION ONLINE 
 
 
educational initiatives on media literacy to help combat misinformation 
online.120  Like governments, companies can and should be creative and 
proactive in developing actions inspired by the 16/18 toolkit that can help 
resolve issues without infringing on speech on their platforms.  As noted 
previously, the UNGPs provide a measure of flexibility in their 
implementation based on the size and resources of a company, which will 
be of particular relevance for smaller social media companies in 
developing appropriate toolkits.121  
After implementing available “good governance” measures, 
companies should consider the second step noted above to act consistently 
with Article 19(3)’s necessity test.  When a company must resort to 
infringing on speech, it should carefully develop a continuum of options 
for dealing with problematic speech and commit publicly to selecting the 
least intrusive means to resolve the problem.  In the context of 
governments, the least intrusive means test often involves, for example, 
selecting civil rather than criminal sanctions for harmful speech.122  For 
private platforms, there are a range of actions to be considered.  For 
example, a company could give its users a means to opt out of offensive 
material.123  Another option could be that a company avoids giving 
problematic posts a circulation boost, but does not delete them or affect its 
users’ ability to circulate the posts.124  A company could also lower the 
ranking of problematic posts in search results or otherwise decrease their 
visibility.125  Although options involving de-emphasizing posts would not 
                                                 
counter-narrative measures to combat extremism online that are funded by 
Facebook).  
120 See Kevin Roose, Google Pledges $300 Million to Clean Up False News, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/20/business/ 
media/google-false-news.html (reporting Google promised $10 million to help 
teenagers identify misinformation).  
121 See supra text accompanying note 60.  
122 For instance, the UN Human Rights Committee has advised State Parties to the 
ICCPR to avoid criminal sanctions in the context of defamation suits. GC 34, 
supra note 39, ¶ 47. 
123 See, e.g., Cohn, supra note 35, at 451 (arguing Facebook gives users the ability 
to choose the types of ads they prefer and could develop “a similar system” so 
users could avoid offensive content rather than Facebook banning the content); 
Llansó, supra note 35 (proposing alternatives to banning speech such as 
“involving members of the site’s community in administering and 
moderating subsections based on those sections’ own norms and policies, 
or allowing individual users to set their own filters and rules for what they 
can see and share on the site.”).  
124 Facebook, for instance, has stated it will not remove Holocaust denial posts, 
but will not give them a circulation boost in its News Feed. Swisher, supra note 
11.  
125 After President Trump accused Twitter of “shadow banning” Republican 
tweets, Twitter released a statement explaining it does not shadow ban (which it 
defined as making tweets “undiscoverable to everyone except to the person who 
posted it”) and explained it ranks search results by boosting those tweets that are 
relevant to users and popular and de-emphasizing tweets “from bad-faith actors 
who intend to manipulate or divide the conversation” in order to promote a 
“healthy conversation.” Vijaya Gadde & Kayvon Beykpour, Setting the Record 
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delete them from the platforms, this analysis treats them as an 
infringement on speech as such techniques could have the effect of 
essentially burying posts.126  Where speech must be banned, geo-blocking 
(i.e., restricting access to Internet content based on location) a particular 
post from view in the particular country could be considered (rather than 
removing the information from the platform).127  A more intrusive 
infringement on speech on this continuum would be to delete a post but to 
allow the speaker to continue to speak on the platform.128  Warnings could 
be issued to a user who repeatedly violates a company’s speech code 
before taking more severe measures.  The most extreme end of the 
continuum may be blocking a user’s account in egregious situations.129  In 
                                                 
Straight on Shadow Banning, TWITTER (July 26, 2018), 
https://blog.twitter.com/official/en_us/topics/company/2018/Setting-the-record-
straight-on-shadow-banning.html. Twitter’s speech code also specifies that its 
range of enforcement actions include making a tweet less visible based on various 
factors, including the “quality of the content.” Our Range of Enforcement Actions, 
supra note 103. Google has also redirected search results to help counter violent 
extremism. Kahn, supra note 119.  
126 See Tessa Lyons, Replacing Disputed Flags with Related Articles, FACEBOOK 
NEWSROOM (Dec. 20, 2017), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/12/news-feed-
fyi-updates-in-our-fight-against-misinformation/ (“Demoting false news (as 
identified by fact-checkers) is one of our best weapons because demoted articles 
typically lose 80 percent of their traffic.”). Very little is known about how 
companies engage in such practices that de-emphasize information on their 
platforms. The need for greater clarity and transparency about how companies 
affect discourse through ranking information on their platforms continues to be a 
crucial aspect of understanding how they regulate – and affect – speech and 
therefore of assessing the extent to which such measures infringe on speech 
relative to other measures.  
127 For example, it may be the case that geo-blocking advocacy to incitement to 
imminent violence in a particular country could help avoid an atrocity in that 
country, but allowing those outside the country to view the speech could help 
formulate responses by the international community, including gathering 
evidence for accountability purposes. 
128 Given the global scale at which many social media companies operate, there 
may be a temptation to rely too much on automated methods to delete speech that 
violate speech codes (as appears to have occurred when Facebook deleted the post 
containing parts of the Declaration of Independence). As noted in a report by the 
Center for Democracy and Technology, it is wrong to “assume that automated 
technology can accomplish on a large scale the kind of nuanced analysis that 
humans can accomplish on a small scale.” CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., 
MIXED MESSAGES? THE LIMITS OF AUTOMATED SOC. MEDIA CONTENT ANALYSIS 
3 (Nov. 2017), https://cdt.org/files/2017/11/Mixed-Messages-Paper.pdf. Relying 
solely on automated technology is likely to delete too much speech and thus be 
inconsistent with the least intrusive means test.  
129 For example, Twitter’s rules note that the company’s most severe enforcement 
action is permanent account suspension. Our Range of Enforcement Options, 
supra note 103. Getting kicked off a major platform has been referred to as the 
“death penalty” in the digital world. See Will Sommer, YouTube Bans Infowars’ 
Alex Jones from Spewing Hate Speech, DAILY BEAST (Aug. 6, 2018, 12:06 PM), 
https://www.thedailybeast.com/youtube-bans-infowarss-alex-jones-for-spewing-
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sum, a variety of corporate options exist that infringe on speech to varying 
degrees, and a company bears the burden of proving it has selected the 
least intrusive means in acting consistently with ICCPR Article 19(3).130 
        Finally, the third step a company should undertake regarding the 
“necessity” test is diligently monitoring whether the measure it has 
selected is helping to further a legitimate aim.  To illustrate, if a company 
deletes posts or bans users from its platform, it needs to assess if that is 
helping create communities that are, for example, resilient to 
radicalization, knowledgeable about misinformation online, and 
tolerant.131  Similarly, a company needs to consider whether such measures 
cause harmful speech to fester on smaller platforms and what impact that 
is having on the legitimate aim.132  A company should assess whether its 
selected measures have negative unintended consequences133 that may 
outweigh the desired benefits and whether such measures unproductively 
                                                 
hate-speech (“In recent weeks, Facebook, Apple, and Spotify had banned 
Infowars, but YouTube had seemed reluctant to impose the death penalty.”)   
130 This section does not comprise a comprehensive listing of options. For 
additional options, see Mike Masnick, Platforms, Speech, and Truth: Policy, 
Policing and Impossible Choices, TECHDIRT (Aug. 9, 2018, 9:42 AM), 
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20180808/17090940397/platforms-speech-
truth-policy-policing-impossible-choices.shtml. Another potential option to be 
considered could involve time-limited content blocking when there are substantial 
risks about immediate violence that would not trigger the same concerns after a 
particular situation is diffused.  
131 Companies have shown an understanding of monitoring whether their selected 
approaches work or not. For instance, when Facebook found that “flagging” 
misinformation was not helpful in combatting misinformation, it switched to 
circulating related articles to give context to misinformation to better combat it. 
Lyons, supra note 126.  
132 See Joanna Plucinska, Hate Speech Thrives Underground, POLITICO (Feb. 7, 
2018, 12:12 PM), https://www.politico.eu/article/hate-speech-and-terrorist-
content-proliferate-on-web-beyond-eu-reach-experts/ (reporting that “with 
increased scrutiny on mainstream sites, alt-right and terrorist sympathizers are 
flocking to niche platforms where illegal content is shared freely, security experts 
and anti-extremism activists say.”); see also Jessica Schulberg et al., The Neo-
Nazis Are Back Online, HUFF. POST (Oct. 3, 2017, 9:43 PM), 
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/nazis-are-back-
online_us_59d40719e4b06226e3f46941 (describing how Stormfront, a neo-Nazi 
internet forum, was able to transfer its domain name from one domain registrar to 
another after being shut down). 
133 See, e.g., Rob Price, YouTube’s Crackdown on Extremist Content and ISIS is 
also Hurting Researchers and Journalists, BUSINESS INSIDER (Aug. 14, 2017, 
7:30 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/youtube-crackdown-terrorist-
extremist-isis-content-hurting-journalists-researchers-2017-8?r=UK&IR=T; J.M. 
BERGER & JONATHON MORGAN, THE ISIS TWITTER CENSUS: DEFINING AND 
DESCRIBING THE POPULATION OF ISIS SUPPORTERS ON TWITTER 54–58 (The 
Brookings Project on U.S. Relations with the Islamic World, Mar. 2015), 
available at https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/isis_twitter 
_census_berger_morgan.pdf (noting account suspensions could result in potential 
loss of key information for law enforcement and terror networks could turn 
insular, reducing de-radicalizing influences). 
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raise the profile of harmful speech and speakers.134  If the selected 
measures are infringing on speech without furthering the legitimate aim, 
the company needs to reconsider its options.  
 In aligning its speech code to the “necessity” prong of ICCPR 
Article 19’s tripartite test, Twitter would need to make some revisions to 
its existing speech code.  First, it should commit publicly to investigating 
(and investing in) “good governance” measures that do not infringe on 
speech to the extent possible.  Second, while Twitter is to be commended 
for setting forth a broad range of enforcement options, it should commit 
publicly to ensuring its selected response is calibrated to constitute the 
least intrusive means.135  Third, Twitter should also commit to monitor 
closely whether the measures it undertakes to promote legitimate aims are 
working.  If a measure that infringes on speech is not helping to achieve a 
legitimate aim, Twitter should revise its approach accordingly.  
3. Is Twitter’s Hate Speech Ban Imposed for a Legitimate Aim? 
 The third prong of ICCPR Article 19(3)’s tripartite test requires 
that any speech restriction be imposed for one of the following legitimate 
aims that benefit the public interest: respect of the rights or reputations of 
others; or the protection of national security, public order, public health, 
or morals.136  Under this “legitimacy” test, it would be an invalid reason 
and a violation of the ICCPR for a government to impose a speech ban to 
end criticism of the head of state (even if administered under the pretext 
of “public order”).137  On the other hand, it would be legitimate for a 
government to invoke a public order rationale if the true motive for a 
speech ban were to stop advocacy likely to result in imminent violence 
against a vulnerable minority.138  In sum, this third prong requires the 
government to identify in good faith one of the legitimate public interest 
reasons for restricting speech.    
In translating Article 19(3)’s legitimacy prong from the 
governmental context to the corporate context, a threshold question arises: 
can we expect corporations to make such public interest determinations 
                                                 
134 See Masnick, supra note 130 (“[De-platforming] someone from these 
platforms often has the opposite impact of what was intended. Depending on the 
situation, it might not quite be a ‘Streisand Effect’ situation, but it does create a 
martyr situation, which supporters will automatically use to double down on their 
belief that they're in the right position, and people are trying to ‘suppress the truth’ 
or whatever. Also, sometimes it’s useful to have ‘bad’ speech out in the open, 
where people can track it, understand it... and maybe even counter it. Indeed, often 
hiding that bad speech not only lets it fester, but dulls our ability to counter it, 
respond to it and understand who is spreading such info (and how widely).”). 
135 As noted previously, further transparency in terms of how these enforcement 
mechanisms operate in practice is essential to allow civil society, academics, and 
others to assess whether least intrusive means are being selected. See supra text 
accompanying note 126. 
136 ICCPR, supra note 36, at art. 19, ¶ 3. 
137 See GC 34, supra note 39, ¶ 38 (“Moreover, all public figures, including those 
exercising the highest political authority such as heads of state and government, 
are legitimately subject to criticism and political opposition.”). 
138 Aswad, supra note 44, at 1322. 
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when restricting speech?  As Professor Klonick has observed, the main 
reason companies remove offensive speech is “the threat that allowing 
such material poses to potential profits based in advertising revenue.”139  
Companies are essentially seeking to moderate content on their platforms 
in order to meet user expectations so they can maximize profits.140  In our 
neo-medieval world, are advertisers essentially the ultimate judges when 
it comes to the content of speech codes?  Can we expect corporations to 
refrain from restricting speech at the expense of their bottom lines?  Does 
gauging the temperature of most users in determining the scope and 
application of speech codes boil down to rule by the majority at the 
expense of the minority in our neo-medieval world?141   
The legitimacy prong of ICCPR Article 19’s tripartite test seems 
to pose the thorniest questions when translating its requirements from the 
context of governments to that of corporate actors.  There are two main 
options worth considering: exempt companies from this prong or hold 
them to the public interest assessments contained in Article 19(3).142   
                                                 
139 Klonick, supra note 22, at 1627.  
140 Id. at 1627 (“If a platform creates a site that matches users’ expectations, users 
will spend more time on the site and advertising revenue will increase. Take down 
too much content and you lose not only the opportunity for interaction, but also 
the potential trust of users. Likewise, keeping up all content on a site risks making 
users uncomfortable and losing page views and revenues.”). See also GILLESPIE, 
supra note 28, at 17 (“[F]rom an economic perspective, all this talk of protecting 
speech and community glosses over what in the end matters to platforms more: 
keeping as many people on the site spending as much time as possible, interacting 
as much as possible.”). Companies may also modify their speech codes (or how 
robustly they enforce them) in response to pressure from governments that are 
less protective of speech and then apply those standards worldwide in their terms 
of service. See Danielle Citron, Extremist Speech, Compelled Conformity, and 
Censorship Creep, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1035, 1041–50 (2018) (describing 
how U.S. platforms altered their content moderation on extremism and hate 
speech in response to threats of European regulation). 
141 In the news coverage of prominent platforms banning Alex Jones, some raised 
the issue of whether public pressure had triggered the de-platforming. See, e.g., 
Nicas, supra note 23. Twitter’s CEO initially defended his company’s decision 
not to ban Mr. Jones by saying “[i]f we succumb and simply react to outside 
pressure, rather than straightforward principles we enforce (and evolve) 
impartially regardless of political viewpoints, we become a service that’s 
constructed by our personal views that can swing in any direction. That’s not 
us.” Jack Dorsey (@jack), TWITTER (Aug. 7, 2018, 5:11 PM), 
https://twitter.com/jack/status/1026984247750316033 [https://perma.cc/8QWN-
A25M]. Twitter later interpreted its rules to merit a suspension (and ultimately a 
permanent ban) of Alex Jones. Romm, supra note 23.  
142 Perhaps a third option could be to allow companies to consider their economic 
incentives along with public interest reasons when restricting speech, but 
implementation of such an option in practice would likely be dominated by 
economic motivations, thereby risking that public interest rationales become mere 
pretexts for decisions based on revenue. Rather than incentivizing the use of 
public interest rationales as pretexts, it is better to be transparent that the 
legitimacy prong is removed for companies (i.e., the first option) or to truly hold 
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Under the first option, companies would be exempted from having 
to justify their restrictions on speech based on public interest 
considerations.  Because of their nature as entities designed to maximize 
shareholder profits, this option assumes that companies cannot be 
expected to engage in public interest determinations that conflict with their 
earning potential.  This option suggests that companies would cite to 
public interest determinations as pretexts for revenue-driven outcomes.  If 
we proceed on this basis, companies would still be expected to respect the 
first two prongs of the tripartite test, i.e., companies should make sure their 
speech codes are not vague and select the least intrusive enforcement 
measure for violations.  If companies publicly commit to implementing 
the legality and necessity tests of ICCPR Article 19(3), society would 
indeed be in a better place in terms of protecting freedom of expression in 
our neo-medieval world than what is currently happening.   
However, this option (which no longer requires speech restrictions 
be linked to the public interest) means that as long as companies adhere to 
their own rules that are not vague and only infringe on speech in the least 
intrusive way, they could restrict speech for any reason at all, including 
maximizing their revenues or promoting their favored policies.  If the 
normative goal for our neo-medieval world is to develop a path that 
continues protecting freedom of expression despite the enormous power 
of private platforms over speech, removing the third prong of the tripartite 
test is unappealing.  Allowing advertising dollars to ultimately decide the 
contours of appropriate speech for platforms does not present a 
particularly attractive future.  And neither is a future in which norms are 
established by the whims of the majority of users (or of the most 
vociferous users).  In such systems, minority and unpopular speakers 
would likely not fare well.143  We would risk leaving little space on 
platforms for a modern-day Galileo to share inconvenient truths or for 
protestors to engage in the digital equivalent of flag burning.  
Under the second option, a company would be expected to justify 
speech restrictions based on the public interest determinations embodied 
in Article 19(3) without consideration of its economic incentives.  The 
benefit of this option is that corporate speech codes would sync with 
international human rights law and seek to afford users the same 
(international law) protections as they have against governments, 
maintaining the scope of individual freedom of expression in the neo-
medieval world.  However, this option is unrealistic absent a substantial 
                                                 
companies to making public interest determinations when infringing on speech 
(i.e., the second option). 
143 Recalling the evolution of First Amendment speech protections is instructive 
in this regard. For well over a hundred years in the United States, interpretations 
of the appropriate scope of freedom of expression through democratically enacted 
laws resulted in bans on criticism of the government, slavery, and U.S. 
participation in wars. ANTHONY LEWIS, FREEDOM FOR THE THOUGHT WE HATE: 
A BIOGRAPHY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 23–38, 157–167 (2007). It was 
ultimately the courts (and not a decision by majority rule) that resulted in an 
interpretation of the First Amendment that protects unpopular, offensive, and 
minority views. Id. 
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societal shift regarding the special role of social media platforms as 
content moderators affecting discourse.  
As Gillespie noted in his overview of content moderation, we 
“desperately need a thorough, public discussion about the social 
responsibility of platforms.”144  He reflects that this conversation 
unfortunately usually happens in the midst of particular controversies 
rather than with respect to the role of these platforms generally.145  He 
states that platforms have tried to portray themselves as neutral “conduits, 
obscuring and disavowing the content moderation they do,” when in 
reality they “invoke and amplify particular forms of discourse, and they 
moderate away others, all under the guise of being impartial conduits of 
open participation.”146     
A broad conversation on the role of social media platforms is 
essential to moving forward on the Special Rapporteur’s recommendation 
to align corporate speech codes with human rights law.  Such a 
conversation should explicitly force a reckoning about the basic trade-off 
that is at stake: with an ever-increasing amount of speech happening online 
in our neo-medieval world, should private platforms be able to develop 
substantive speech rules for any reason of their own choosing, or should 
individuals be able to enjoy the same rights to freedom of expression 
whether they are under the authority of a government or of a global social 
media platform?  Perhaps such a conversation could trigger a societal shift 
from expecting companies ban speech as a measure of good corporate 
citizenship to building an expectation that good corporate citizenship 
means that platforms should respect international human rights standards 
when curating content.147  If there were a growing consensus that platforms 
should respect the internationally recognized expression rights of users, 
then it would be possible that the economic incentives of companies would 
not undermine their ability to conduct public interest determinations.  This 
could facilitate a path towards implementation of the second option: 
holding companies to the legitimacy prong of the tripartite test.  
 Assuming we could reach such a societal consensus, would 
companies then be well-positioned to make public interest determinations?  
From the GNI’s experience, we know companies can assess whether 
governments are restricting speech based on a legitimate specified public 
interest reason or whether restrictions are invoked for illicit motives.148  
But this prong continues to pose potentially tricky questions when applied 
to corporations as judges of the public interest.  If a government has made 
                                                 
144 GILLESPIE, supra note 28, at 206. 
145 Id. at 206. 
146 Id. at 206–07. 
147 Such a broad conversation may also include consideration of whether some of 
the ills of cyberspace (hate speech, extremism, misinformation, etc.) can also be 
treated with societal interventions offline. Often to the extent that there is a 
conversation on the need for content moderation, the discourse (or news 
reporting) seems to stop at what platforms can do about the problem without 
considering what society at large can do about the issues. 
148 See supra notes 63–67 and accompanying text. 
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a public interest determination, should it be second-guessed by a 
company?  For example, if a government does not believe hate speech on 
a platform is likely to lead to incitement to violence offline or otherwise 
does not risk the rights of others, could a social media company come to a 
different conclusion and properly justify a hate speech ban based on 
different public interest determinations?  Should the level of deference by 
a company depend on how democratic the government actor is?149  If a 
company assesses that a government is unable or unwilling to govern in 
the public interest, would it then be appropriate for the company to second-
guess a government’s public interest determination?  Alternatively, should 
companies make their own public interest decisions regardless of 
determinations that have (or have not) been made by governments?  
Applying the third prong of Article 19(3)’s tripartite test raises a number 
of questions that would benefit from further conversations by interested 
stakeholders to assess the contours of what is feasible and to avoid 
corporations invoking public interest rationales as pretexts for revenue-
driven decisions.   
4. Observations on Applying the UNGPs to Corporate Speech Codes  
 This analysis concludes that the legality and necessity prongs of 
ICCPR Article 19(3)’s tripartite test can be adapted to the corporate 
context.  Implementation of these two prongs with respect to speech codes 
would go a long way in helping to protect freedom of expression online.  
For example, in terms of the “legality” test, private speech codes could 
(and should) be modified to give concrete guidance rather than relying on 
vague prohibitions.  Similarly, regarding the “necessity” test, companies 
should commit to engaging in the diligence required to select the least 
intrusive means of enforcing their speech codes.  The third prong of the 
tripartite test, however, is the most difficult one to implement because, 
under the current state of affairs, expecting companies to disregard key 
economic motives in favor of the public interest seems unrealistic.  Most 
                                                 
149 Sometimes democratically-elected governments make decisions to limit 
speech that are not consistent with international human rights law. European 
approaches to limits on hate speech and extremism have recently been criticized 
by human rights groups and the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of 
Expression. See, e.g., AMNESTY INT’L, DANGEROUSLY DISPROPORTIONATE: THE 
EVER-EXPANDING NATIONAL SECURITY STATE IN EUROPE 37–44 (2017) 
(criticizing several European countries for laws with vague prohibitions, such as 
the “glorifying” or “promoting” of terrorism); David Kaye (Special Rapporteur 
on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression), Rep. of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of 
the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, ¶ 25, U.N. Doc. A/71/373 (Sept. 
6, 2016) (criticizing European human rights law for failing to “define hate speech 
adequately”). See also Kristen Eichensehr, Digital Switzerlands 167 U. PA. L. REV 
(forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 41) (https://poseidon01.ssrn.com/ 
delivery.php?ID=96302009212308610900908712606901607303307804701002
2006094075126002102113011024125007006058039044111113028125000086
1220690031111230820690480920961200710901100940310350930151221061
0012511006500912212210911308012312603008903006907012410900100708
4120111&EXT=pdf) (“[C]ompanies will ‘fold’—complying with rather than 
challenging, government requests—when they perceive governments and users to 
be aligned.”).  
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likely they would invoke public interest determinations as pretexts for 
revenue-driven decisions.  That said, if there is a societal shift to expecting 
platforms to respect international freedom of expression protections 
online, it may be more feasible for companies to make public interest 
determinations. But, questions remain that would benefit from additional 
multi-stakeholder deliberations about implementation of this prong.  
III. REFLECTIONS ON POTENTIAL CRITICISMS AND BENEFITS OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AS THE DEFAULT RULE FOR CORPORATE 
SPEECH CODES 
 Having examined the type of revisions to corporate speech codes 
that would be triggered if companies align them with ICCPR Article 19, 
this analysis next turns to assessing potential criticisms and benefits of the 
Special Rapporteur’s proposed approach.  A range of potential criticisms 
and concerns are examined, including whether international human rights 
law provides companies with adequate guidance in regulating speech, 
whether U.S. companies should promote First Amendment standards 
instead, and potential adverse impacts companies could have on the 
international human rights regime.  The potential benefits that are 
considered include improved free speech protections for individuals in a 
neo-medieval world, a principled basis for companies to regulate speech 
worldwide, and the fact that the framework to implement this approach is 
already in place.  This Article concludes that the benefits of progressing 
towards alignment of corporate speech codes with international human 
rights law outweigh the potential downsides.  
A. Criticisms  
 The Special Rapporteur’s recommended approach has already 
been criticized.  For example, one commentator questioned the Special 
Rapporteur’s proposed approach because “[i]t is something of a misnomer 
to speak of international human rights law as if it is a single, self-contained 
and cohesive body of rules.  Instead, these laws are found in a variety of 
international and regional treaties that are subject to differing 
interpretations by states that are parties to the conventions as well as 
international tribunals applying the laws.”150  Such a concern 
inappropriately conflates international human rights law with separate 
bodies of law embodied in regional human rights instruments.151  The 
                                                 
150 Evelyn Douek, U.N. Special Rapporteur’s Latest Report on Online Content 
Regulation Calls for ‘Human Rights by Default,’ LAWFARE: BLOG (June 6, 2018, 
8:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/un-special-rapporteurs-latest-report-
online-content-regulation-calls-human-rights-default (emphasis added). 
151 See supra notes 90–97 and accompanying text for a discussion of differences 
between the international human rights regime and regional regimes with regard 
to freedom of expression. When there are areas of overlap between these systems, 
international and regional human rights mechanisms will occasionally make joint 
statements on high profile topics, but that does not mean the international and 
regional systems are the same or congruous in every regard. See, e.g., UNITED 
NATIONS (UN) SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON FREEDOM OF OPINION & EXPRESSION, 
ORG. FOR SEC. & CO-OPERATION IN EUR. (OSCE) REPRESENTATIVE ON FREEDOM 
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differences between international and regional human rights law do not 
make international human rights law’s protection for freedom of 
expression internally inconsistent; it just means international and regional 
human rights law are separate bodies of law that do not always align.152  
The call of the UNGPs (and the Special Rapporteur) is for companies to 
respect international, not regional, human rights law.  Under international 
human rights law, the key protection for speech comes from Article 
19(3)’s tripartite test, which applies to all speech restrictions.153  
 Another potential concern is whether the international human 
rights law regime on freedom of expression provides sufficient guidance 
to companies in applying speech restrictions.154  Of course, this 
international human rights regime on speech is not a detailed tax code 
setting forth a comprehensive listing of unprotected terms or phrases for 
the entire world.  The inherent nature of speech adjudications requires 
                                                 
OF THE MEDIA, & ORG. OF AM. STATES (OAS) SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON 
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, & AFRICAN COMM’N ON HUMAN & PEOPLES’ RIGHTS 
(ACHPR) SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION & ACCESS TO 
INFO., JOINT DECLARATION ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND ‘FAKE NEWS’, 
DISINFORMATION AND PROPAGANDA (Mar. 3, 2017), https://www.osce.org/ 
fom/302796?download=true (commemorating that UN and regional free 
expression experts endorse several approaches to combatting false news, such as 
affirming ICCPR Article 19’s tripartite test for any restrictions, condemning broad 
bans on “fake news” as unduly vague, and calling for an end to the criminalization 
of defamation); Joint Declaration on Freedom of Expression and Countering 
Violent Extremism, OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, 
https://www.ohchr.org/En/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=199
15&LangID=E (last visited Aug. 10, 2018) (agreeing on a number of measures to 
combat terrorism that inappropriately restrict speech, including vague bans on 
“glorification of terrorism” and “apology for terrorism”).  
152 It should be noted that nations cannot invoke interpretations of regional human 
rights mechanisms to get out of their international obligations. For example, 
Germany cannot invoke the case law of the European Court of Human Rights 
approving of bans on Holocaust denial under the European Convention on Human 
Rights to justify its Holocaust denial bans under the ICCPR. See supra notes 92–
93 and accompanying text, for the differences between the two systems with 
regard to denials of historic atrocities. 
153 See supra note 47 and accompanying text (explaining that even mandatory 
speech bans in international treaties are subject to ICCPR’s Article 19(3)’s 
tripartite test).  
154 See, e.g., Citron, supra note 140, at 1063 (dismissing international human 
rights law as a source of guidance for tech companies in defining hate speech and 
terrorist-related speech because “human rights law contains exceptionally flexible 
standards” and recommending companies look to European approaches). It should 
be noted that the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression has criticized 
the vagueness of European human rights law with respect to hate speech. Kaye, 
supra note 149. See also David Kaye, How Europe’s New Internet Laws Threaten 
Freedom of Expression: Recent Regulations Risk Censoring Legitimate Content, 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Dec. 18, 2017), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ 
europe/2017-12-18/how-europes-new-internet-laws-threaten-freedom-
expression (describing a wave of European regulations, including with respect to 
terrorist material and hate speech, that “risk interfering with” international 
freedom of expression standards).  
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investigations into context and related judgement calls.  ICCPR Article 
19(3)’s tripartite test does provide a rigorous, principled, and coherent 
standard that allows for such judgment calls in considering restrictions on 
speech in each country.  Despite the fact that there is not a UN court 
dedicated to issuing legally binding decisions on proper interpretations of 
the ICCPR, the UN’s human rights machinery has provided a substantial 
amount of guidance and recommendations in interpreting this article.  For 
example, after requesting the views of civil society and State Parties, in 
2011 the UN Human Rights Committee issued lengthy guidance about 
Article 19, ranging from issues of defamation to restrictions based on 
national security to access to information.155  The Special Rapporteur 
position has existed since 1993 and has issued numerous reports and 
guidance on a variety of issues arising under Article 19.156  Any criticism 
that Article 19 does not provide sufficient guidance seems to overlook the 
body of recommendations by UN independent experts on this topic.  If 
companies were to accept the call to regulate speech in line with ICCPR 
Article 19(3)’s tripartite test, they would be using an internationally 
accepted and principled standard that gives space for consideration of 
context in making the judgment calls inherent in speech adjudications.  
They would also find the recommendations of the Human Rights 
Committee and the Special Rapporteur valuable in implementing such an 
approach. 
 Another criticism could stem from the fact that some may prefer 
that American companies curate speech on their platforms in accordance 
with the First Amendment, which provides one of the most robust 
protections for speech in the world.157  The founders, leading officers, and 
legal teams of many prominent U.S. social media companies seem to have 
been heavily influenced by First Amendment principles, particularly at the 
outset of the companies’ operations.158  However, the speech codes for 
                                                 
155 GC 34, supra note 39, ¶¶ 1–52. 
156 Freedom of Opinion and Expression – Annual Reports, OFFICE OF THE HIGH 
COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Freedom 
Opinion/Pages/Annual.aspx (last visited Aug. 10, 2018) (analyzing issues ranging 
from encryption and anonymity to regulation of online content to the treatment of 
whistleblowers).   
157 See, e.g., David French, A Better Way to Ban Alex Jones, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/07/opinion/alex-jones-infowars-
facebook.html?action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=story-
heading&module=opinion-c-col-right-region&region=opinion-c-col-right-
region&WT.nav=opinion-c-col-right-region (criticizing tech companies for 
abandoning First Amendment principles and using subjective standards to ban 
Alex Jones from their platforms). See also Noah Feldman, Free Speech Isn’t 
Facebook’s Job, BLOOMBERG: BLOOMBERGOPINION (June 1, 2016, 11:08 AM), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-06-01/it-s-not-facebook-s-job-
to-guarantee-free-speech (expressing outrage initially at tech companies for 
selling out on First Amendment principles but concluding society cannot expect 
companies to respect freedom of expression). 
158 Klonick, supra note 22, at 1618–25 (finding American lawyers trained in First 
Amendment jurisprudence to have heavily influenced the initial speech codes and 
approaches of leading platforms); Ammori, supra note 22, at 2283.  
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such companies have steadily moved away from U.S. constitutional free 
speech protections.159  Simply put, we are no longer in a situation in which 
prominent companies would be abandoning speech codes that reflect First 
Amendment approaches in favor of international approaches.160  
  Moreover, a rigorous and good faith interpretation of ICCPR 
Article 19’s tripartite test of legality, necessity, and legitimacy would 
bring company speech codes much closer to First Amendment standards 
than what is currently happening with the curation of speech on platforms. 
As previously noted, many company speech codes are vague.161  Corporate 
implementation of ICCPR speech protections means companies would 
need to revise their codes to give users appropriate notice of the parameters 
of unacceptable speech.  The speech codes would also need to be adjusted 
so as to not discriminate against any group.162  Often the combination of 
having to overcome vague terminology and avoid discrimination against 
any group makes it difficult to craft broad speech bans.163  In addition, 
corporations would need to commit to selecting enforcement options that 
reflect the least intrusion on speech interests to be consistent with the 
“necessity” prong of the tripartite test.164  Thus, the proper application of 
at least the first two prongs of Article 19(3) coupled with other ICCPR 
protections, such as the ban on discrimination, would serve as a principled 
check on corporate speech bans if applied in good faith.165    
 Another potential critique is that the call to align company speech 
codes with international human rights law is based on a framework that is 
not legally binding, i.e., the UNGPs.  This means that grounding speech 
codes in international human rights law would be a voluntary action taken 
by companies to live up to the international community’s expectations.  
Can we entrust the future of freedom of expression online to the mere hope 
that companies will voluntarily implement the UNGPs?  Perhaps we have 
                                                 
159 Ammori, supra note 22, at 2274–84 (describing how speech codes of U.S. 
platforms depart from First Amendment principles but are influenced by the First 
Amendment); Citron, supra note 140 (describing how the European Union 
pressured American companies to change their approaches to hate speech and 
terrorist material). 
160 If prominent social media companies had displayed a commitment to 
grounding their speech codes in the First Amendment despite pressure from 
advertisers and the public, this analysis of the concerns and benefits of aligning 
corporate speech codes with international human rights law would be significantly 
different.  
161 See supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
162 See supra note 42 and accompanying text. 
163 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY & HOWARD GILLMAN, FREE SPEECH ON CAMPUS 
93–94 (Yale University Press 2017) (assessing that U.S. courts often do not 
uphold bans on fighting words because such prohibitions are either vague or show 
favoritism towards particular groups).  
164 See supra text accompanying notes 112–135.  
165 It may also be challenging for a company to justify its speech restriction under 
Article 19’s three prong test as “necessary,” for example, to maintain public order 
if a government (e.g., the United States) has not assessed there is a public order 
problem that justifies speech restrictions. See supra notes 148–149 and 
accompanying text.  
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to focus on voluntary corporate initiatives for at least two reasons.  First, 
intervention by the U.S. government is highly unlikely given that First 
Amendment protections for corporate speech provide the United States 
with little room for legally binding solutions.  Second, an international 
negotiation to regulate speech on platforms, including content moderation, 
is undesirable because it would no doubt be dominated by powerful 
countries with weak records on freedom of expression that would seek to 
roll back international speech protections.  To begin with, global trends 
show governments have become more restrictive with respect to online 
speech, which means such countries would seek to commemorate their 
problematic approaches to online speech in any new international 
instrument.166  Such trends coupled with the recent withdrawal by the 
United States, a traditional global leader in promoting robust free 
expression norms in multilateral fora, from the UN Human Rights Council 
(which would likely negotiate any such agreement) means the prospects 
for any new international treaty protecting speech as robustly as ICCPR 
Article 19(3) does are bleak.167      
 Moreover, the trajectory of the business and human rights 
movement has been positive (though not swift) with companies 
increasingly undertaking measures to align their operations with 
international human rights standards on a voluntary basis.  A 2016 study 
found that of 275 General Counsels and senior lawyers surveyed, forty-six 
percent of businesses have human rights policies.168  For companies 
making more than ten billion dollars in revenue, eighty-four percent have 
human rights policies.169  As noted previously, within the information and 
communication technology sector, companies in the GNI such as Google, 
Facebook, Microsoft, and Oath (the successor to Yahoo! and America 
Online) have opted to respond to worldwide governmental requests to 
restrict speech in ways that seek to avoid infringements on international 
human rights.170  Oath has a specialized business and human rights unit 
focused on expression and privacy.171  Many of these companies (and 
others) voluntarily issue transparency reports regarding requests from 
governments that infringe on expression and privacy and the corporate 
                                                 
166 See, e.g., SANJA KELLY ET AL., FREEDOM HOUSE, FREEDOM ON THE NET 2017: 
MANIPULATING SOCIAL MEDIA TO UNDERMINE DEMOCRACY (Nov. 2017), 
available at https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FOTN_2017_Final.pdf.  
167 See Susan Hannah Allen & Martin S. Edwards, The U.S. Withdrew from the 
U.N. Human Rights Council. That’s Not How the Council Was Supposed to Work, 
WASH. POST (June 26, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-
cage/wp/2018/06/26/the-u-s-withdrew-from-the-u-n-human-rights-council-thats-
not-how-the-council-was-supposed-to-work/?utm_term=.83478fe1cf27 
(discussing U.S. withdrawal from the Council and its implications).  
168 James Wood, The New Risk Front for GCs—Nearly Half of Contracts Have 
Human Rights Clauses, LB Research Finds, LEGAL BUS.: BLOG (Sept. 8, 2016, 
8:46 AM), https://www.legalbusiness.co.uk/blogs/the-new-risk-front-for-gcs-
nearly-half-of-contracts-have-human-rights-clauses-lb-research-finds/. 
169 Id.  
170 See supra text accompanying notes 63–67. 
171 Business & Human Rights at Oath, OATH, https://www.oath.com/our-
story/business-and-human-rights/ (last visited Aug. 10, 2018).  
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actions taken in response.172  The fact that social media companies are 
searching for a legitimate basis to regulate speech around the world173 
should also incentivize corporate action towards this already established 
global standard embodied in ICCPR Article 19.  
 Yet another potential criticism with regard to encouraging 
companies to align their speech codes with international human rights law 
is the feasibility of such an endeavor given the scale at which the 
companies operate.  No government has had to implement its human rights 
obligations at the scale at which these global platforms operate.  This 
Article does not seek to dismiss how challenging it is for companies to 
administer their speech codes on a global basis.174  That said, companies 
have already decided to have complex speech rules and are already 
applying them globally.  They appear to realize that they need more staff 
and better procedures to implement their existing codes.175  Others have 
already argued eloquently for better procedural safeguards and 
transparency measures in corporate content moderation.176  The shift 
towards grounding the speech codes in international human rights law 
merely seeks to anchor the existing global speech curation process to 
speech codes that are consistent with international standards for restricting 
speech, rather than to speech codes that are “homegrown” approaches to 
restricting speech.     
 Though this section is not exhaustive in terms of potential 
criticisms, perhaps two more bear mentioning.  With U.S. abandonment of 
                                                 
172 Several prominent social media companies issue transparency reports 
concerning governmental requests to remove speech from their platforms, but 
YouTube became “the first major social media platform to put out a report on the 
number of posts it removes under its own content policy” in April 2018. Liz 
Woolery, Companies Finally Shine a Light into Content Moderation Practices, 
CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH.: BLOG (Apr. 25, 2018), 
https://cdt.org/blog/companies-finally-shine-a-light-into-content-moderation-
practices/. 
173 See infra notes 186–189 and accompanying text.  
174 For a discussion of the complexity of global content moderation processes, see 
Klonick, supra note 22, at 1631–48 and GILLESPIE, supra note 28, at 111–72. 
175 See supra note 27 and accompanying text; How Social-Media Platforms 
Dispense Justice, THE ECONOMIST (Sept. 6, 2018), 
https://www.economist.com/business/2018/09/08/how-social-media-platforms-
dispense-justice?fsrc=scn/tw/te/bl/ed/howsocialmediaplatformsdispense 
justicethedeciders (reporting that by the end of 2018 “Facebook will have doubled 
the number of employees and contractors dedicated to the ‘safety and security’ of 
the site, to 20,000, including 10,000 content reviewers. YouTube will have 10,000 
people working on content moderation in some form.”). While some companies 
have been increasing the number of content moderators, decisions continue to be 
made with extraordinary rapidity, which is highly problematic given the time 
needed for human judgment in speech adjudication. See GILLESPIE, supra note 28, 
at 121 (“Fast here can mean mere seconds per complaint – approve, reject, 
approve – and moderators are often evaluated on their speed as well as their 
accuracy, meaning there is reward and pressure to keep up…. Each complaint is 
thus getting just a sliver of human attention, under great pressure ….”).  
176 See supra note 35.  
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its seat at the Human Rights Council, there are serious risks of backsliding 
at the United Nations on freedom of expression protections, as those 
opposed to this right may become more active in future resolutions 
involving freedom of expression.177  Although Council resolutions are not 
legally binding, they can reflect at times an important political consensus 
on speech issues that can impact the rest of the UN’s human rights 
machinery.178  Not participating at the Human Rights Council will also 
prevent the United States from having a persuasive voice with respect to 
the selection of the next Special Rapporteur on freedom of expression, 
which could negatively impact future developments on this topic.  In 
addition, the United States is generally able to have one of its citizens 
elected to the UN Human Rights Committee, and that independent expert 
traditionally brings important U.S. perspectives to the Committee’s 
recommended interpretations of the ICCPR.  Recently, the U.S. candidate 
was not elected, which means the Human Rights Committee will not have 
an independent expert who can bring American experiences and 
perspectives to its work.179   
 This combination of factors could result in a roll-back of freedom 
of expression protections at the international level.  Though the Human 
Rights Committee and Special Rapporteur’s existing guidance should help 
to temper such backsliding, regressive recommendations about the scope 
of this right could happen.180  If it does, that would be a significant 
drawback to linking corporate speech codes to international human rights 
law.  However, if American companies (with First Amendment roots and 
inclinations) become active and effective stakeholders in trying to promote 
broad protections for speech under international human rights law, their 
influence could potentially serve as a check on such regression in the 
absence of U.S. leadership at the Human Rights Council.181 
                                                 
177 Peter Micek, Saving the U.N. “Internet Resolution” from Sharks Circling in 
Geneva, ACCESS NOW (July 10, 2018, 7:27 PM), https://www.accessnow.org 
/saving-the-u-n-internet-resolution-from-sharks-circling-in-geneva/ (“Normally, 
the U.S. would have been a key member state working on this [Internet] 
resolution. In previous years, the U.S. has been part of the ‘core group’ of authors, 
and has co-sponsored the text. But this year the U.S. was absent, having 
withdrawn from the Human Rights Council just as the negotiations for this 
resolution began. . . . Protecting human rights is difficult and messy work . . . and 
leaves people who cannot protect themselves even more vulnerable. If the absence 
of the U.S. emboldened states seeking more control over the internet, the lesson 
here is clear: those truly committed to human rights must engage more deeply.”).  
178 For example, the Special Rapporteur on freedom of opinion and expression 
often cites to these resolutions. See, e.g., Kaye, supra note 149, ¶¶ 22, 33, 41, 45.  
179 Barbara Crossette, The UN Eyes a World with Less US, THE NATION (July 30, 
2018), https://www.thenation.com/article/un-eyes-world-less-us/.  
180 One way forward could be to link corporate speech codes to existing guidance 
from the UN’s human rights machinery to avoid negative impacts if regressive 
recommendations emerge in the future.  
181 For an interesting discussion of the potential for the rise of U.S. technology 
companies to serve as a check on governments, see Eichensehr, supra note 149, 
at 49 (“[H]aving two powerful regulators, rather than only one, can benefit 
individuals’ freedom, liberty, and security because sometimes it takes a powerful 
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 Conversely, there could be concerns about the potential impact 
that corporate implementation of international human rights norms could 
have on the international human rights regime itself if companies do not 
interpret ICCPR Article 19 in good faith.  Given that an international 
human rights court solely dedicated to adjudicating ICCPR rights does not 
exist, the UN machinery’s recommended interpretations of UN standards 
have come primarily from the Human Rights Committee, the Special 
Rapporteur, and (occasionally) certain high-profile, non-binding 
consensus resolutions adopted by UN member states.182  If companies 
begin applying Article 19(3) in their content moderation operations and 
take up the Special Rapporteur’s call to produce “case law,” there could 
be an active fountain of new “jurisprudence” involving the ICCPR’s 
speech protections, which could influence the direction of international 
freedom of expression rights.  It is thus even more important that 
companies apply the international standards in good faith rather than in 
revenue-driven ways that could undermine the robustness of the standards 
with respect to state actors.  This seems to be a risk that is worth taking in 
order to afford ICCPR protections for users’ speech when they are under 
the authority of platforms.183  The alternative is to leave individuals under 
speech codes that are untethered to any traditional sources of restraint in 
regulation, i.e., the First Amendment or international human rights law. 
B. Benefits 
         A number of significant benefits exist to grounding the substantive 
restrictions of company speech codes in international human rights law.  
First and foremost, anchoring corporate speech codes to ICCPR Article 19 
represents the best chance of protecting the freedom of expression interests 
for users throughout the world.  As previously discussed, companies 
currently set substantive speech codes as they see fit.  While they may 
have started out heavily influenced by the First Amendment, their codes 
have steadily moved away from that standard due to revenue concerns, 
public pressure, and governmental pressure to re-interpret their terms of 
service in a more restrictive way.184  As the U.S. government is unlikely 
to regulate the speech codes of private companies given constitutional 
protections for corporate speech rights and international regulation of such 
                                                 
regulator to challenge and check another powerful regulator.”). Admittedly, the 
role of strengthening the human rights regime seems to go beyond what is called 
for in the UNGPs, but it would be consistent with the companies’ mission 
statements to promote the free flow of information and self-interest to promote 
broad expression rights online.   
182 See, e.g., Human Rights Council Res. 20/8, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/20/8, ¶ 1 
(July 16, 2012) (affirming for the first time that individuals have the same rights 
online as they have offline); Council Res. 16/18, supra note 115 and 
accompanying text.  
183 Some of the suggestions proposed by the Special Rapporteur’s report—
involving improved transparency, procedures, and oversight for content 
moderation—may be helpful in assessing whether companies are respecting the 
standards in ICCPR Article 19’s tripartite test. See SR Report, supra note 79.   
184 See supra notes 139–140 and accompanying text. 
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codes is undesirable,185 seeking to have companies align their speech 
codes with international human rights law remains the best avenue for 
protecting individuals’ speech rights in our neo-medieval world.  The 
alternative would be for each company to develop its own code based on 
its own views of speech and revenue needs, which is not a stable 
foundation for the long-term protection of speech.  The fact that Twitter 
and Facebook recently expressed an openness to considering international 
human rights law in their speech codes also gives momentum to this 
path.186 
 Aligning speech codes with the ICCPR also has a number of 
benefits for companies.  Major platforms appear to be seeking a principled 
basis for regulating speech in every country of the world in order to give 
legitimacy to their global content moderation.  For example, Facebook 
CEO Mark Zuckerberg stated: 
With a community of more than 2 billion people all around the world, 
in every different country, where there are wildly different social and 
cultural norms, it’s just not clear to me that us sitting in an office here 
in California are best placed to always determine what the policies 
should be for people all around the world. And I’ve been working on 
and thinking through: How can you set up a more democratic or 
community-oriented process that reflects the values of people around 
the world? That’s one of the things that I really think we need to get 
right. Because I’m just not sure that the current state is a great one.187   
 
Similarly, a lawyer working for Google in 2006 was tasked with figuring 
out how to respond to the Thai government’s demand to remove offensive 
YouTube videos of the king.188  After meeting with Thai people and 
observing how shaken ordinary citizens were by these insults to their king, 
she felt “Who am I, a U.S. attorney sitting in California to tell them: ‘No, 
we’re not taking that down.’”189  She and her team removed the videos 
from view within Thailand.190  
 Companies need not recreate the wheel in developing speech 
norms that have worldwide legitimacy if they base their content 
moderation policies on international human rights standards.  Since 1966, 
there has been an international treaty (the ICCPR) that protects freedom 
of expression with an international machinery for monitoring its 
implementation.  Aligning company speech codes with existing 
international human rights law would give companies a legitimate, 
principled, and international basis upon which to make decisions that 
affect freedom of expression throughout the world.  For example, instead 
                                                 
185 See supra notes 166–167 and accompanying text.  
186 See supra notes 33–34 and accompanying text. 
187 Ezra Klein, Mark Zuckerberg on Facebook’s Hardest Year, and What Comes 
Next, VOX (Apr. 2, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/2018/4/2/17185052/ 
mark-zuckerberg-facebook-interview-fake-news-bots-cambridge.  
188 Klonick, supra note 22, at 1623. 
189 Id. 
190 Id. 
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of struggling for a way to justify his decision to permit Holocaust denial 
posts on his platform, Mr. Zuckerberg could have cited to the UN Human 
Rights Committee’s interpretation of ICCPR Article 19.191 Similarly, in 
the case of the YouTube videos mocking royalty in Thailand, a corporate 
decision grounded in this Committee’s recommendations192 might have 
appeared more principled to Thai citizens than what they were left with—
the views of lawyers in Silicon Valley.      
 Companies would also benefit from linking their speech codes to 
international human rights law because countries often pressure 
companies (1) to interpret their own terms of service in a restrictive 
manner, or (2) to remove content from their platforms that conflicts with 
local law but would otherwise be protected by international human rights 
law.  Grounding corporate speech codes in Article 19 of the ICCPR can 
help companies better resist such measures under either situation.  For 
example, if Europe pressures tech companies to interpret their hate speech 
codes loosely or to remove illegal hate speech under unrealistic time 
frames, companies could push back by saying their codes are aligned with 
international human rights law and thus cannot be interpreted or 
implemented in such a fashion.  Similarly, it places companies in an 
untenable spot to say to governments: “We will not remove speech critical 
of the government because you need to respect users’ international 
freedom of expression rights, but we can certainly remove that content if 
we feel like it.”  Companies will be on firmer ground to resist illicit 
governmental demands and laws if they treat user speech as protected 
under the same rubric for corporate speech codes and governmental 
regulation. 
 Aligning corporate speech codes with international human rights 
law protections, which is what the UNGPs call for, has the added benefit 
of providing a way forward that does not require international negotiations 
                                                 
191 The UN Human Rights Committee has taken the position that laws that restrict 
opinion about historical facts are an unacceptable infringement on speech. GC 34, 
supra note 39, ¶ 49 (“Laws that penalize the expression of opinions about 
historical facts are incompatible with the obligations that the Covenant imposes 
on States parties in relation to the respect for freedom of opinion and expression. 
The Covenant does not permit general prohibition of expressions of an erroneous 
opinion or an incorrect interpretation of past events.”).  
192 The UN Human Rights Committee has criticized laws that protect royalty or 
heads of state from criticism. GC 34, supra note 39, ¶ 38 (“[T]he Committee has 
observed that in circumstances of public debate concerning public figures in the 
political domain and public institutions, the value placed by the Covenant upon 
uninhibited expression is particularly high. Thus, the mere fact that forms of 
expression are considered to be insulting to a public figure is not sufficient to 
justify the imposition of penalties, albeit public figures may also benefit from the 
provisions of the Covenant. Moreover, all public figures, including those 
exercising the highest political authority such as heads of state and government, 
are legitimately subject to criticism and political opposition. Accordingly, the 
Committee expresses concern regarding laws on such matters as, lese majesty, 
desacato, disrespect for authority, disrespect for flags and symbols, defamation 
of the head of state and the protection of the honour of public officials . . . .”). 
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about how to tackle the rise of private sector regulation of speech.  The 
UNGPs already exist, were endorsed by consensus at the Human Rights 
Council, and reflect the international community’s expectations that 
companies will respect human rights in all their operations, including 
content moderation.  Similarly, the ICCPR already exists and rigorous 
application of Article 19(3) provides a strong check against inappropriate 
restrictions on speech.  Engaging in international negotiations to develop 
a way forward with respect to transnational private sector content 
moderation creates an unacceptable risk of regression in free expression 
rights for a variety of reasons previously discussed.193  In sum, there is 
significant value to using an international regime that already exists, has 
global approval, and that, if applied properly, would result in corporations 
respecting the international freedom of expression rights of users 
throughout the world. 
C. Observations on Criticisms and Benefits  
 Overall, while some potential pitfalls exist to anchoring corporate 
speech codes to international human rights law, the benefits seem to 
outweigh such downsides.  In particular, this approach appears to be the 
most viable route to promote corporate respect for individuals’ freedom of 
expression rights in a neo-medieval world.  In addition, this approach 
would likely increase companies’ legitimacy in content moderation while 
also help companies resist demands from governments to restrict speech 
in ways at odds with international human rights law.  Given that we appear 
to be in a unique norm-setting moment in the thinking of platforms with 
regard to the substantive content of their speech codes, this approach 
provides the best available way forward for users and companies.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
 Recent events, such as Facebook’s removal of a post that 
contained an “offensive” part of the Declaration of Independence and its 
subsequent decision to permit Holocaust denial posts on its platform as 
well as the decision of many tech giants to de-platform a conspiracy 
theorist, have highlighted the enormous power of corporate actors over 
freedom of expression.  Though much of the commentary to date has 
focused on the need for platforms to increase transparency and add 
procedural safeguards for users when moderating content, the summer of 
2018 seemed to mark a norm-setting opportunity for the substantive 
content of corporate speech codes.  In June 2018, the UN Special 
Rapporteur on expression called on companies to align their speech codes 
                                                 
193 See supra notes 166–167, 177. Also, on the domestic level, the constant 
debates about whether to treat platforms as utilities, publishers, or something else 
are also not likely to reach a resolution that would resolve the substantive issues 
of corporate speech codes in time to affect the existing norm setting moment. For 
a discussion of the legal issues involved, see Klonick, supra note 22, at 1660–63.  
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with international human rights law.  After the controversy surrounding 
whether to de-platform Alex Jones, two social media giants seemed open 
to considering international human rights law as a basis for their speech 
decisions.  
 This Article set out to analyze what it would mean in practice for 
such companies to align their speech codes with international human rights 
law: specifically, whether it is feasible for companies to do so and whether 
such an outcome is desirable.  This Article began with an overview of 
applicable international human rights law standards.  The ICCPR, the most 
relevant treaty on freedom of expression, provides broad protections for 
speech across borders, but permits restrictions on speech if every prong of 
Article 19(3)’s tripartite test is met. The prongs are as follows: any 
restriction (1) must not be vague, and (2) must constitute the “least 
intrusive means” to (3) achieve a legitimate public interest.  Under 
international human rights law, any restriction on speech must meet this 
tripartite test, even those restrictions imposed under treaty provisions that 
mandate barring incitement to violence and other harms.  While Article 19 
is not directly applicable to companies (as they are private actors and not 
states), the 2011 UNGPs reflect the international community’s expectation 
that companies will arrange their business operations, including their 
terms of service, to respect international human rights.   
 In order to assess the feasibility of aligning corporate speech codes 
with the ICCPR, this Article focused on a concrete example: Twitter’s hate 
speech rules.  With respect to the first prong of Article 19(3)’s tripartite 
test, the analysis found that Twitter’s rules were vague and would need to 
be revised to give users more notice of what is not allowed.  In analyzing 
the second prong of the tripartite test in the context of a corporate actor, 
this Article argued that a company should (1) evaluate the means at its 
disposal to achieve a legitimate aim without infringing on speech; (2) 
select enforcement options for speech code violations that least intrude on 
speech interests; and (3) periodically assess whether the selected measure 
helps to achieve the legitimate aim.  This Article noted that Twitter should 
commit publicly to using the least intrusive enforcement actions to deal 
with speech code violations.  With respect to the third prong—regulating 
speech for the public interest—this Article observed that companies 
generally regulate speech based on revenue-related motivations, which 
could make this prong challenging to implement in good faith.  This 
Article recommended a broad societal conversation to clarify the role of 
platforms in the protection of speech, which would help facilitate public 
interest determinations.  Overall, aligning corporate speech codes with 
much of ICCPR Article 19’s tripartite test is feasible, but further 
discussion is needed with respect to the role of companies in making 
public interest determinations.  
  In considering the desirability of having companies align their 
speech codes with international human rights law, this Article also 
considered a variety of potential criticisms of such an approach.  It 
concluded that arguments of the alleged incoherency of international 
human rights law often inappropriately conflate the international human 
rights regime with regional regimes rather than reflecting an analysis of 
69             THE FUTURE OF FREEDOM                    [Vol. 17 
OF EXPRESSION ONLINE 
 
 
the ICCPR.  This Article determined that criticisms of human rights law 
not providing sufficient guidance to companies actually do not fully grasp 
how ICCPR Article 19(3)’s tripartite test works, the recommended 
interpretations of the UN’s human rights machinery, or the fact that speech 
adjudications inherently involve judgment calls that consider contextual 
factors.  To the extent commentators would prefer American companies to 
enforce First Amendment principles in content moderation, this Article 
noted that the speech codes of prominent platforms no longer reflect such 
principles, and a proper application of Article 19(3)’s tripartite test would 
likely protect more speech than is currently the case.  While recognizing 
that the UNGPs reflect the international community’s expectations but do 
not constitute a legally binding framework, this Article noted the trajectory 
of the business and human rights movement has been positive, and the 
corporate interests in adjudicating speech based on universally accepted 
standards could incentivize voluntary adoption of the Special Rapporteur’s 
recommended approach.  The analysis also noted that U.S. regulation is 
unlikely and international regulation is undesirable, as it would likely 
result in a substantial diminution of international free speech protections.  
But the analysis expressed concerns about the implications for future 
developments at the international level on freedom of expression given 
U.S. withdrawal from the UN Human Rights Council. 
  This Article ultimately concluded that the advantages of aligning 
corporate speech codes with international human rights law outweigh the 
potential disadvantages.  This approach seems to be the most feasible way 
to protect against infringements on users’ freedom of expression rights by 
private actors.  The approach should also be appealing to companies who 
seem to be grappling to find a principled basis upon which to regulate 
speech worldwide, as well as a principled basis on which to resist 
governmental demands that violate freedom of expression.  The fact that 
international human rights law and the UNGPs reflect an international 
consensus is also a valuable aspect of this approach, as it avoids lengthy 
and potentially problematic international negotiations involving corporate 
speech codes.  In our neo-medieval world, the most viable way to protect 
individuals’ freedoms of expression rights is to seek to have governments 
implement their international human rights obligations regarding speech 
and encourage companies to align their codes with these standards.   
 Since Eleanor Roosevelt led the U.S. delegation in negotiating the 
ICCPR, U.S. diplomats have consistently fought in UN fora to maintain 
broad speech protections under international law.  With the rise of 
powerful corporate actors engaging in a parallel governance exercise over 
speech alongside governments throughout the world, it is important for 
these companies to recognize that in many ways they have been handed 
the baton of respecting and promoting international freedom of expression 
protections.  American platforms may not have asked to be in this position, 
but this is an important norm-setting moment in which tech giants could 
greatly and positively influence the future of freedom of expression online.  
They should acknowledge their roles as powerful co-regulators of speech 
and hold themselves to the same protections for freedom of expression that 
apply to state actors.  We should be encouraging companies to respect 
international human rights in our brave neo-medieval world or face a 
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future in which their speech codes are untethered to any speech-protective 
norms.  
